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Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With
Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)
PROFESSOR STEPHEN L. PEPPER*
ABSTRACT
Three foundational conceptual dichotomies underlie questions of lawyers’
professional ethics. Commonly unnoticed and unarticulated, they affect our
perception and resolution of questions at all levels: from large scale theory and
policy, through the framing of particular rules or principles, and down to
consideration of specific situations and conduct. In this article Professor Pepper
identifies and explores each of these three in turn. In addition the article
specifically considers how each dichotomy might affect our understanding and
possible resolution of fundamental questions in the ethics of representing
corporations.
The first dichotomy considers the question of what is the risk for which
professional ethics is the remedy. The traditionally understood situation creating
the need for a “profession” is that of a relatively weak and in need patient, client
or customer interacting with a relatively powerful, knowledgeable professional
trained and able to assist with aspects of life considered particularly important
or necessary. That is, a vulnerable patient or client in need, and a professional
there to assist, but also well-situated to exploit. Professional obligations and
ethics are designed to mandate service and prevent exploitation. In lawyers’
professional ethics over the last several decades the predominant concern has
been a quite different vision: a powerful client assisted by a knowledgeable
sophisticated professional in a project or conduct that may cause unjustifiable
damage or harm to third parties or society. Often the paradigmatic client in this
image is a large corporation. In this alternative vision, it is not the client who is
vulnerable and at risk, but third parties and society as a whole. The third
dichotomy turns not to the underlying risk, but to the remedy. Should lawyers’
professional ethics consist primarily of rules, as it does now? Or would it be more
useful and effective to turn to individual lawyer’s character, practical wisdom,
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and discretion as the basis for ethical decision-making? The second dichotomy,
developed less fully here than the other two, focuses on the foundational
orientation of lawyers ethical obligations. Is it to the individual client? Or is it to
some larger community interest. A final section of the article applies the three
dichotomies to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in lawyer
practice, illustrating how the dichotomies make a difference and how keeping
them in mind can be helpful in analysis and choice.
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INTRODUCTION
Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies
underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence
of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes
some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient.
Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to
be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special;
who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to
this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article:
one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful
professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination
toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of
lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’
preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to
some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or
interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk,
or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or
that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primar-
ily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to
make a thought out, all things considered, decision?
Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and
address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on
multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a
particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular
category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s
inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will
reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions
are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the
dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and
choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is
an effort to ameliorate that problem.
Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the
function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding
section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then
asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational
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orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to
some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the
corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations
and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’
ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or
should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and
character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be
made on a situation-by-situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer.
Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are
considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a
spectrum or continuum). At several points after its introduction, in Parts I and II,
the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions
suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV
applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer
practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these
distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion
more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections
among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.
I. THE PRIMARY RISK: LAWYER OR CLIENT?
Is the purpose of lawyers’ ethics to protect the client from the lawyer, or the
lawyer from the client? Who is more likely to exploit whom? In the day-to-day
working lives of most lawyers, from what direction does the moral risk come?
Pause for a moment before reading further and consider: when you imagine a
lawyer and a client, what kind of client do you have in mind? Seriously, take a
moment to think about this.
What kind of lawyer are you thinking of, and what sort of task is that lawyer
performing? Who is strong; who is vulnerable? Who is primarily in charge? This
initial assumption or image—usually unnoticed and inexplicit—is likely to have
a powerful effect on one’s approach to the ethics of lawyering, from the
theoretical to the very specific. Are you imagining an individual as the client,
relatively unsophisticated and not knowledgeable about law and legal mecha-
nisms and processes? Or are you imagining the client as a relatively large
corporate entity, acting through relatively sophisticated and knowledgeable
corporate management? The traditional understanding in the professions gener-
ally assumes a knowledgeable, dominant professional and a far less knowledge-
able and weaker client. The purpose of professional ethics is protection of that
consumer (client or patient) from the powerful professional. Within lawyers’
ethics a counter-image has come to dominate: a powerful client using the
lawyer’s assistance to harm third parties or more general social interests. We shall
consider each in turn.
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A. THE BASIC TRADITIONAL PROFESSIONAL PARADIGM
Two primary factors distinguish “professions” from other trades or means of
making a living. First, the service provided is of particular importance,
sometimes a matter of necessity. Health care, legal assistance, architectural or
engineering services provide typical examples. Second, to be competent and
trustworthy to provide the necessary services, the professional must have
mastered extensive specialized knowledge, training, skills and experience. With
what we think of as the “learned professions,” this usually entails years of higher
education combined with some form of extensive on the job training or
apprenticeship as requisite preparation. The traditional understanding of the
professional relationship is that of a vulnerable lay person in need of help with
something particularly important to the individual or to society in general (often
to both); and a substantially more knowledgeable and powerful professional in a
position both to provide that help and to exploit that vulnerability.1
The paradigmatic example or image is that of the sick patient: a person anxious
about what’s wrong and dependent upon a physician to help with something very
important—their health. If a person has a bad ache in the abdomen, should she be
concerned about an ulcer, a heart attack, appendicitis? Or is it just indigestion?
Typical examples for the legal profession would be a married couple wanting
wills, a small businessperson in need of a contract, an accident victim in need of
compensation and assistance, or an employee (or employer) concerned about
wage and hour requirements or workplace discrimination. If you want to direct
what will happen to your property upon death, is it adequate to just jot a note
down and leave it in your safe deposit box at the bank; or is something more
elaborate required? And what is that something more, and how do you go about
doing it? Is my employer paying me what is required, or cutting corners on the
law? The patient or client is in need and without the background or expertise to
evaluate the quality or adequacy of the service to be provided; and the
professional is sometimes in a position to exploit that need for his or her own
benefit rather than for the benefit of the client or patient. If the surgeon
recommends surgery, is it because you are in need of it, with serious risks if you
do not have it; or is it because the surgeon makes substantially more money from
surgery than with an alternate treatment? Or consider an example from a
prominent lawyers’ ethics course book:
Novak . . . has agreed to represent a plaintiff in a personal injury suit for
a . . . contingent fee of one-third of the amount recovered. The other side has
offered, before Novak begins work, to pay his client $15,000. Based on what he
1. For in-depth explorations of the concept and practice of professionalism, see generally ELLIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY, AND POLICY (1994); ELLIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A
STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (1986); WILBERT MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES
AND RULES (1970).
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knows about the case, Novak believes the actual damages that a jury would
award would be more like $60,000, but it would take him about 200 hours of
work to recover that amount, and, of course, the client might not recover
anything at all. Novak has concluded that is best to recommend to the client that
he accept the $15,000 immediately so that Novak can pocket a $5,000 fee with
little effort and go on to the next case.2
If the lawyer provides this recommendation without fully informing the client of
the reasons and the alternative which might well serve the client better ($45,000
dollars later rather than $10,000 now), the lawyer will have exploited the client’s
vulnerability and lack of understanding to serve his own interest, not the
client’s—a paradigm of the risks presented by the professional relationship.
In sum, (1) the client or patient often has a strong need for something he cannot
understand or evaluate effectively; (2) the professional is making a living from
that need; and, as a result, (3) is in a position to exploit the client or patient’s
vulnerability for personal profit. This vulnerability on the part of the person in
need generates the notion of special obligations and ethics beyond the ordinary
norms and regulations of the market. Ordinary economic incentives, market
structures and rules (profit maximization and caveat emptor, for example) are
thought to be inadequate in these special situations due to (1) the disparity of
knowledge and power and (2) the particular importance of the needed service.
Thus, the consumer is thought to be particularly vulnerable in regard to
something important. This is the risk. The remedy is the notion of professional
obligation. We decide that those who provide services in these situations must be
“professionals,” and that means one denominated a “professional” has special
obligations and status beyond and above the market.3 Despite the fact that the
professional is making a living from the need of the client or patient, she must put
that person’s interests above her own. Even if the surgeon makes money from
surgery, surgery ought not be recommended if it is not the best treatment. Even if
settling the lawsuit would mean a quick, easy contingent fee, the plaintiff’s
lawyer may not recommend it if the client is likely to come out substantially
better by the long, hard efforts of the lawyer’s work in discovery and trial
2. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
100 (10th ed. 2008).
3. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor presented a summary of this justification in her dissent in Shapero v. Ky. Bar
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988). In brief:
Precisely because lawyers must be provided with expertise that is both esoteric and extremely
powerful, it would be unrealistic to demand that clients bargain for their services in the same
arms-length manner that may be appropriate when buying an automobile or choosing a dry cleaner.
Like physicians, lawyers are subjected to heightened ethical demands on their conduct towards those
they serve. These demands are needed because market forces, and the ordinary legal prohibitions
against force and fraud, are simply insufficient to protect the consumers of their necessary services
from the peculiar power of the specialized knowledge that these professionals possess.
Id. at 489–90.
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preparation. Or, conversely, if the litigator is working on an hourly fee basis she
ought not discourage an early, reasonable settlement because she prefers the
larger fee to be earned through extensive discovery and trial preparation. A large
part of professional regulation is a set of ethical prescriptions designed to prevent
the professional from exploiting the vulnerability of their customer.4 Limits are
placed on the ways professionals are allowed to maximize profit over and above
the limits imposed by civil and criminal law.
There is, of course, a great deal of skepticism among sociologists, economists,
and legal scholars as to the reality of this mechanism.5 Professionals are
privileged to create a limited entry monopoly for the provision of an essential
service that consumers are not well equipped to evaluate. This appears on the
surface to be more an engine of exploitation than a means to limit it, and the
rhetoric and reality of professionalism can be seen as a fac¸ade to disguise that
arguable reality.6 To some extent this more jaundiced view is certainly accurate
for at the least some segment of each profession. Some lawyers, doctors,
engineers and architects are solely motivated to maximize financial return, with
professional obligations and status as just window dressing. But it is also true that
the more positive view is descriptively accurate for some segment of each
profession. We might denominate the more skeptical view as the “scam”
understanding of professionalism, and the more traditional as the “consumer
protection” understanding.7 It is a difficult and unanswered empirical question as
to which view is the more accurate in the aggregate, and the answer probably
varies from profession to profession. It also may well be true that for most
professionals each is a part of their work reality; sometimes one more dominant
in his or her behavior and self-conception, sometimes the other.
4. See infra notes 8, 27–31, 34 for some of the legal profession’s rules.
5. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (“[C]onfidentiality
benefits lawyers because it increases the demand for legal services”); Thomas D. Morgan, Calling Law a
“Profession” Only Confuses Thinking About the Challenges Lawyers Face, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 542, 547–50
(2012) (“[L]awyers have used professionalism rhetoric in the past to defend practices that outside observers
could easily see served the interest of lawyers but not the interest of the public or the interest of justice.”);
THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 57–66 (2010); Russell G. Pearce, The Professional
Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1231–32 (1995) (“[T]he widespread perception is that law practice is a business. This
perception so fundamentally undermines the Business-Profession dichotomy that it has provoked a professional
crisis.”).
6. Trade groups frequently lobby for the state to designate and regulate them as “professionals,” thus limiting
entry and competition. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing
1890–1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 497–503 (1965); Walter Gelhorn, The Abuse of
Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 10–19 (1985).
7. These two alternatives can also be usefully thought of as the internal and external perspectives on
professionalism. The sociologists and economists are observing the professions as interested, objective
outsiders; those structuring, administering, and practicing in the professions are seeing them from the inside, as
participants.
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It is clear, however, that on at least two important levels we function on the
basis of the more positive, idealistic, consumer protection view and not on the
more skeptical understanding. First, we institutionalize the professions with
formal quasi-governmental bodies of governance: we license professionals,
limiting those who can practice and setting standards for admission; and, to at
least some limited extent, we provide professional discipline—including the
possibilities of suspension or loss of the license—under articulated rules of
professional conduct. Thus, the polity acts as if it takes the professional model
seriously and believes it reflects the reality of professional conduct and
self-understanding. Conversely, this also indicates that as a society we do not
believe that the “scam” view put forward by many sociologists and economists
reflects the true state of professionalism, but rather that it is a risk to be prevented
by the institutionalization of the profession. Second, and perhaps more important,
large segments of the population—including the more well-educated and
well-off—take the implications of professionalism and professional licensure and
regulation seriously: they go to doctors and lawyers, architects and engineers,
and trust them with their lives and projects because they are licensed and
formally identified as doctors and lawyers, architects and engineers, not because
they know substantially more about their qualifications or performance. Even in
the internet age many do little or no independent checking or research, and would
often find little that would be helpful or understandable even if they did.8
Frequently, reliance may be placed primarily on a referral from a friend,
colleague, or other professional (the family practitioner who refers to the
otolaryngologist, for example), but the stamp of professional licensure and
identity probably remains quite significant in the level of reliance, trust, and lack
of separate investigation of qualifications and record. Thus, the dominant
common understanding of professionalism remains the traditional model.
B. A DIFFERENT CONCERN AND A DIFFERENT RISK
With regard to lawyers’ ethics, over the last thirty-five years a counter-vision
has come to be influential and perhaps dominant. Some empirical work on
lawyers and their clients suggests that the model drawn from the nature of the
professional relationship sketched above is in error, and that frequently the
situation is a relatively weak and economically dependent lawyer serving a
stronger and more dominant client.9 Certainly it is true that more lawyers provide
service to relatively large organizations than to individuals or small businesses
8. Ethics rules limit the information lawyers can disseminate about themselves. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 7.1–7.3 (2010) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. Limitations also restrict the extent to which lawyers
can identify the specialty areas in which they practice and have expertise. See MODEL RULES R. 7.4.
9. See, e.g., ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW
FIRM 231–43 (1988) (“Recent scholarship questions the very foundations of [the large law firm’s] power,
arguing . . . that the large law firm is the captive of its clients . . . .”).
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and organizations.10 Under the counter-vision, the powerful lawyer/client
combination presents a risk to weaker and more vulnerable third parties or to
aggregate social interests. The image called up is that of the client as a large
corporation with a lot of legal business, sophisticated and demanding manage-
ment, and a corporate profit ethic instead of a humane conscience; juxtaposed
against a lawyer in a much smaller economic unit (albeit perhaps a large,
profitable law firm), dependent upon that client for a substantial portion of his or
her livelihood in a market for legal services growing more and more competi-
tive.11 Lawyers assisting Lehman Brothers in end of the quarter transactions to
hide debt on quarterly reports12 or those assisting Enron in structuring and
creating the off the books partnerships to present misleading financial state-
ments,13 would be recent paradigm examples. The concern is what is thought of
as relatively common conduct, such as assisting a client in formal compliance
with water pollution regulations, or with securities financial reporting require-
ments, while the actual effect of the conduct is substantive violation of the those
water pollution or securities requirements (that is, facilitating actual water
pollution combined with formal or window-dressing legal compliance; facilitat-
ing misleading financial statements combined with at least arguable formal legal
compliance).14 The risk envisioned is lawyer and client allied in wrongdoing,
with the lawyer adding a veneer of arguable legal compliance to the conduct; that
is, adding the power of the law to the already substantial financial and political
power of the large corporate actor or of a powerful individual actor.15 This is a
10. See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 42, 46–47 (2005).
11. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG
LAW FIRM 48–54 (1994); MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER
31–39 (2004).
12. See Floyd Norris, Demystifying the Lehman Shell Game, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/business/02norris.html; Michael J. de la Merced & Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Report Details How Lehman Hid Its Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/03/12/business/12lehman.html.
13. For a full description of the Enron debacle, see generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS (Nancy Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds. 2004).
14. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26 (1988).
Here is a simple, nonexhaustive array of the types of advice a lawyer can give in the context of
compliance counseling. The lawyer might advise that: a) The plan in its current form is prohibited; b)
The plan is clearly prohibited, but the risk of detection is slight or, if significant, expected profits will
still exceed the likely penalties; c) Same as (b) except that the lawyer advises that there is a
non-negligible risk of getting caught and being exposed to later liabilities, so that prudence dictates
forbearance; d) The form of the plan is clearly prohibited, but can be cosmetically recast in another
form that will accomplish its essential purposes; e) The substance of the plan is clearly prohibited, but
can be made legal if altered in some substantive particulars; f) The plan contravenes the regulation’s
basic purposes, but it technically complies with the regulations, and is legal . . . .
Id. An imagined situation involving water pollution is explored infra Part IV. C.
15. For a recent example from the academic literature, see Brad Wendel’s discussion of abusive deposition
tactics. See W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 24–26 (2010) [hereinafter WENDEL, FIDELITY]
(based on the description of the Dalkon Shield products liability litigation in DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL
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quite different risk than the traditional model. Instead of a vulnerable client who
needs to be protected, we have a powerful client threatening harm to third parties
enabled by the lawyer’s traditional professional obligation and loyalty. The
problem from this perspective is to construct a professional ethic or a set of
professional rules to protect third parties from lawyer enabled client wrongdoing.
There is an alternative understanding of this second risk. Some lawyers
perceive professional ethics as designed to protect lawyers themselves. The rules
provide a mandatory basis for refusing to assist in wrongful client conduct, thus
insulating the lawyers from being drawn or co-opted into wrongdoing. The
lawyer can genuinely say, “I can’t structure the transaction that way for you
because the ethics rules forbid it.” “That would amount to a lie, and I can’t do
that.” “We have to reveal that or I will be in violation of the ethics rules.”
Professional ethics from this perspective protects primarily the lawyers and only
derivatively potentially victimized third parties or social interests.
C. THE CORPORATION AS CLIENT: THE PROBLEM OF AMORAL ETHICS
SQUARED AND THE MISMATCH WITH THE TRADITIONALLY
UNDERSTOOD RISK
Large corporations are generally far more powerful and wealthy than most
individual clients and most small business or small organization clients. It usually
does not seem descriptively accurate to see them as vulnerable in relation to their
lawyers. The vulnerability would seem to go the other way: even very large,
multi-city or multinational law firms are small in relation to many of their major
corporate clients and the law firms are economically dependent on them.16 This
dependence is even more pointedly true for individual partners and associates
within these firms in relation to their particular major clients.17 These lawyers are
economically vulnerable to a choice by such clients to sever the relationship or
lower the amount of services purchased. Not only would this reduce income for
the firm, it would substantially undermine these lawyers’ relative position and
influence within the firm. In-house lawyers working in the corporations are not
just vulnerable to but also clearly dependent upon the client. They are employees
with very limited short-term mobility and just the one client.18
A second aspect of the corporate situation also suggests the client as the source
of moral risk rather than the party in need of protection. Corporations do not have
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 669 (1994)). For an early example, see David Luban’s choice
of a former CIA director’s extortionate use of confidential governmental information to avoid criminal
prosecution as the opening example in his initial examination of lawyers’ ethics. David Luban, The Adversary
System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 83, 85 (David Luban ed., 1983).
16. NELSON, supra note 9.
17. See REGAN, supra note 11, at 37–38.
18. See Sung Hui Kim, The Ethics of In-House Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION
MAKING IN CONTEXT 197–220 (Leslie Levin & Lynn Mather, eds., 2012) and references therein.
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the range and complexity of motivations, emotions, and restraints on conduct
(including moral and social) that individuals have. Both by law and pursuant to
the intentions of the shareholders and management (and also by general social
and political understanding), the primary goal of a for-profit corporation is
shareholder value or profit19—a quite impoverished and limited universe of
values compared with that of most natural persons. Lawyers often presume that
their individual clients seek the most material well-being (money or its
equivalents) or the most freedom, thus allowing the lawyers to function in a
simplified moral universe. But as I have developed previously, this is a serious
error in ethical perception.20 It is confusing means with ends. Most of us do not
value only or primarily material welfare and maximum freedom. Were that the
case, we would not marry or have children, both choices which ordinarily limit
material resources and freedom quite distinctly. For corporations, however,
the assumption is not an error. Corporations may marry (merge), or create or
acquire subsidiaries, but they do so only with the intent of maximizing
shareholder value or return. For individuals, social relationships are commonly a
significant source of moral anchoring, guidance and restraint21—friends, spouses
and colleagues interact, counsel and, to some extent, judge. Corporations don’t
have friends and spouses. They do have relationships and connections—as do the
persons who comprise management—but all of that takes place within the
context of the limited understanding of the purpose and role of the corporation.22
Corporate managers are charged with this limited range of goals. They are to
pursue primarily and fundamentally shareholder value and profit, while the rest
of the full panoply of other human goals and considerations are at best secondary,
if not altogether absent.23 They thus function under a limited, or role specific,
19. For a discussion of the shareholder primacy theory, see infra note 23.
20. Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyers’Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 188–89
(1999) [hereinafter Pepper, Ethics in the Gap]; see also Katharine R. Kruse, The Promise of Client-Centered
Professional Norms, 12 NEV. L.J. 341, 345–46 (2012); Katharine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal
Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 122–26 (2010) [hereinafter Kruse, Cardboard Client].
21. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
637, 641–42 (1986); Stephen Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
657, 664–65 (1986).
22. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the
Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855, 872–73 (1998) (describing the “stakeholder theory,” where a
corporation has an ethical obligation to consider the interests of stakeholders beyond shareholders, such as
employees, customers, and the local community, in making decisions for the corporation).
23. Milton C. Regan, Corporate Speech and Civic Virtue, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 289, 294
(Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, eds., 1998) and sources cited therein. If the primary motivation is something
different, the directors or management may well be involved in what the law categorizes as a waste of corporate
assets, which may, if sufficiently clear, rise to the level of being legally actionable. See id. (discussing the “well
known case” Dodge v. Ford Motor Company); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. 906 A.2d 27, 74
(Del. 2006) (“A claim of corporate waste will arise only in the rare ‘unconscionable case where directors
irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.’”). This corporate focus on maximizing shareholder wealth
stems from the theory of shareholder primacy. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 735–38 (2005); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP.
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ethic or set of ethics. This is similar to lawyers, who have long been thought to
function under a particular role specific morality. The frequently described
“standard conception” sets out that the lawyer must serve the client’s interests as
the client sees them, and that so long as the conduct on behalf of the client is not
unlawful, a lawyer is not to limit that conduct on the basis of moral
considerations aside from the law.24 Further, under this view, the lawyer is not to
be judged or evaluated from the perspective of ordinary morality, but rather from
the perspective of advancing the client’s goals “within the bounds of the law.”25
Putting the two roles together raises the problem of professional (arguably
amoral) ethics squared: (a) For the corporate executive, professional ethics put
the primary value and role obligation on increasing shareholder value or profit;
(b) For the lawyer the primary value and role obligation is providing access to
law and facilitating use of the law and its devices in servicing the client’s goals. In
each case ordinary morality and values are discounted or trumped by the
delimited values and obligations of role specific morality. Professional ethics is a
limited, special purpose ethics. Putting the limited roles and goals of the business
executive and the lawyer together in service to a very large and powerful
non-human entity—the typical major corporation—is a frightening notion. It is
not an articulated part of the professional role of either the executive or the
lawyer to consider ordinary human decency, simple right and wrong, straightfor-
ward morality and ethics. Management ordinarily consults with lawyers; usually
there is a high-ranking general counsel with an office or division staffed by
numerous lawyers. But management does not ordinarily consult with or have the
services of an ethicist or moral counselor. The problematic and not uncommon
situation is when lawful conduct facilitative of the corporation’s overall goal of
maximizing shareholder value is morally wrong in relation to third parties or
aggregate social interests.26 Whose job is it to bring up this problem? Whose job
is it to weigh the various factors of the situation and reach a resolution? This is a
basic contemporary problem of corporate legal practice: the current ethic of
deferring to client interests and choice when combined with the reality of a
L. 277, 280–91 (1998); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33. For a more nuanced view of shareholder primacy, see Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Lynn Stout, THE
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012).
24. David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV. 673, 673–76 (2012) (reviewing WENDEL, FIDELITY,
supra note 15) (tracing the origin of the phrase “standard conception” of a lawyer’s role).
25. WENDEL, FIDELITY, supra note 15, at 6, 29; see also Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 671 (1978); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil
Advocate, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 544, 554 (1983). Following Schwartz, the three principles comprising
the conception are usually set out as “partisanship, [moral] neutrality and nonaccountablility.” Luban, supra
note 24, at 673–74.
26. This becomes more problematic if the category of conduct the lawyer is willing to facilitate is stretched
to include that which is “arguably” lawful. See WENDEL, FIDELITY, supra note 15, at 32–33; DAVID LUBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 159 (2007).
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powerful corporate client without a humane sensibility or conscience may make
it particularly likely that lawyers will assist in morally dubious or wrongful
conduct by corporate clients.
D. THE CURRENT RULES
The traditional theoretical underpinning of professionalism is clearly the client
vulnerability model. The rules governing the legal profession reflect and embody
this understanding, with client protective provisions extensive and dominant and
third party protective provisions quite limited. This is perhaps clearest in the
remarkably detailed and multiple conflict of interest provisions designed to
ensure that the lawyer will not be tempted by her own interests or those of third
parties to exploit the client’s vulnerability.27 The fundamental and primary rules
are also client protective, beginning with competence and moving through
communication (with the client, of course), confidentiality (of client related
information) and fees (elaborate and restricting the amount and kinds of fees that
can be charged far more extensively than ordinary market limits and regula-
tion).28 Parts of other important rules also protect the client, for example the
multifaceted rule on organizations as clients.29 There are rules designed to protect
third parties, but they are fewer and far more limited. Perhaps the most pointed
and significant is the prohibition on assisting client fraud or criminal conduct.30
In this category one also finds requirements for limited truthfulness and fairness
to third parties.31
E. WHAT TO DO ABOUT ADDRESSING TWO SUCH DIFFERENT RISKS
1. RULES
How might we address the problem of two different general categories of
clients, the vulnerable on one hand, and the powerful and dominant on the other?
Perhaps the most obvious place to start would be the rules. One option would be
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RS. 1.7–1.12 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 MODEL RULES]. These rules
were clearly designed with individual clients in mind, and work very awkwardly with large organizations as
clients and large multi-office law firms as lawyers. See, e.g., Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics:
Resolving the Tension Between Confidentiality Requirement and the Contemporary Lawyers’ Career Paths, 31
J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 258–63 (2007). The rules are more extensive and explicit than the conflict of interest
provisions for any other profession.
28. 2003 MODEL RULES R. 1.1 (Competence); 2003 MODEL RULES R. 1.3 (Diligence); 2003 MODEL RULES R.
1.4 (Communication); 2003 MODEL RULES R. 1.5 (Fees).
29. 2003 MODEL RULES R. 1.13.
30. 2003 MODEL RULES R. 1.2(d). Note how limited this provision is. Assisting breach of contract or tortious
conduct by the client is not prohibited; facilitating a client’s unjustifiable harmful conduct toward third parties is
not prohibited.
31. 2003 MODEL RULES RS. 3.3, 4.1 (Candor Toward the Tribunal and Truthfulness to Others); 2003 MODEL
RULES RS. 4.2, 4.3 (Communication with Non-Clients).
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to create two entirely distinct sets of rules. One set would be for the traditionally
assumed relatively vulnerable individual as client, and would track most of the
current rules. A second set would be designed for powerful, relatively non-
vulnerable clients (paradigmatically large corporations) and would aim more at
restraining the powerful lawyer-client combination rather than protecting the
client from the lawyer. The rules for confidentiality for example, might be quite
different. For individuals, we might keep the very broad and inclusive confidenti-
ality obligations we have now. For corporations we might well choose to frame
more extensive exceptions.32 A sub-set of common rules would probably appear
in both codes, perhaps in identical form, for example the rule prohibiting
assistance in crime or fraud. But, might we frame an additional provision for
corporations, prohibiting lawyer facilitation of tortious corporate conduct
threatening serious injury to third parties?33 No such provision currently exists.
An alternative, somewhat similar option, would be to have only one set of
rules, as we do now, but to restructure them to formally recognize and attempt to
remedy the two quite different kinds of risks. A significant segment of the rules
would be conceptualized—as now—around protecting the client from exploita-
tion by the lawyer. But another significant segment would be framed around the
concern of the risk of powerful clients making use of lawyer enabled access to the
law to harm third parties. For example, conflict of interest rules and confidential-
ity rules have traditionally protected the client. The most recent amendments to
the confidentiality rules, however, have reflected concern about harm to third
parties, not exploitation or victimization of clients.34
Underlying both of these options would be a change in the theoretical
conception of the role of the lawyer. This might take the form of essentially two
different theories of professionalism and professional obligation: one protective
of the client in relation to the lawyer, the other protective of third parties in
relation to the client-lawyer combination. In the alternative, along the lines of the
options mentioned immediately above, we might attempt to form a single theory
32. Some have argued that confidentiality obligations in relation to corporate clients are both unnecessary
and counterproductive. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 5, at 28–32 (1998); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE 67, 111 (2000); William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar?: Professionalism Without Monopoly, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 639, 652–53 (2003) [hereinafter Simon, Who Needs the Bar]; William H. Simon, The Kaye
Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 243, 281–282 (1998).
33. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics
of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1559–1564, 1576–1580 (1995) [hereinafter Pepper, Counseling at the
Limits] for discussion of similar possibilities. Or, going further, the possibility of prohibiting lawyer assistance
to intentional breach of contract that threatens serious injury to third parties. See generally Robert Cooter &
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1432 (1985) (providing a general
background of the concept of efficient breach); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky,
68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982) (providing an early criticism of the doctrine); Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient
Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 777 (2012) (providing a recent canvas of theory and the continued controversy).
34. 2003 MODEL RULES R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3).
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that could encompass both risks. Another option might be to leave the rules
essentially as they are, but to structure a theoretical perspective taking account of
both risks and assisting lawyers to recognize both and deal with each as presented
by the particular occasion.
2. THE CORPORATION AS CLIENT AND AS RISK—FOUR POSSIBILITIES
If the paradigm of the client-lawyer combination as the primary risk is the large
corporation, perhaps part of the remedy (that is, the aim and content of lawyers’
ethics) ought to be a separate articulated approach to serving corporate clients.
Four possibilities for structuring an ethics for corporate lawyering will be briefly
surveyed. It should be noted that it does not seem that they are mutually
exclusive. A blend or conjunction of two or more might be the most effective and
practical.
a. Like a Real Person
The current generally accepted approach is to treat the corporation as if it
were a real person. That is the dominant model provided by corporate law—the
corporation as an artificial imaginary person, recently reinforced by the Supreme
Court’s controversial Citizen’s United decision.35 Under this approach, the
difficulty is to figure out how to treat the corporation as a person. Current Model
Rule 1.13(a) provides the master answer: “A lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.” It is simply a question of corporate law and authority: figure out
who has authority to decide for the corporation in regard to the particular work
and treat those real persons as one treats a client. The remainder of Rule 1.13,
“Organization as Client,” is for the most part a series of provisions addressed to
possible conflicts of interest and abuse of authority issues within the organization.
Wrongdoing by the corporation, to the extent it is addressed at all, is
transmuted in Rule 1.13(b) from a problem of wrongdoing by a powerful
corporation into a question of authority within the corporation: if certain
convoluted requirements are met, “the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher
authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization . . .” Unlike Rule
1.2(d), the trigger in 1.13(b) is not crime or fraud by the client, and the concern
does not seem to be harm to third parties. Rather, the concern appears to be only
harm to the corporation, with the triggering wrongful conduct articulated as “a
violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization and that is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization . . . ” A set of ethics conceived and designed
35. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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to protect vulnerable individual persons is transferred to a quite different kind of
entity, with the substantial risks presented by that kind of client left unaddressed
and apparently unnoticed.
On the other side of this argument, supporting an ethic of treating corporate
clients as if they were persons, is the simple fact that both ownership and
management are composed of real persons. The foundational role of lawyers is to
provide access to law,36 and one of the primary and most powerful legal
mechanisms of the contemporary world is the corporate form of enterprise.37
This legal device is intended to be generally available and useful, both for the
facilitation and the limitation of conduct, and it would thus seem as ethically
appropriate (or requisite) for lawyers to provide legal assistance to the aggregate
persons comprising ownership and management38 as it is to provide access to the
law of divorce or of home ownership transactions for individuals. That
corporations are made up of and are instrumental to actual persons does not
necessarily answer our question, however. The fact that these real persons are
part of a very large, complex, and powerful law-created entity may suggest that a
significantly different ethic, set of ethics, or set of rules ought to be framed to
address the situation of the corporation.
b. The Lawyer as Counselor or Conscience
Part of the lawyer’s ethical obligation could be to engage in dialogue with the
client on those occasions when lawful (or arguably lawful) corporate conduct
appears to involve moral wrongdoing (or arguable wrongdoing) in relation to
third parties or aggregate social concerns. The obligation would be to raise with
the client the issue of possible wrongdoing in ordinary moral or social terms
despite the fact that the conduct appears to (1) serve corporate interests and (2) be
within the law. Rule 2.1 permits the lawyer to raise such issues, but it is not
required under our current understanding of lawyers’ ethics.39 The idea here
would be to require such dialogue in the case of corporate clients.40 An effort
36. See WENDEL, FIDELITY, supra note 15, at 52–53; Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role, AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (1986). The argument based on the value of client autonomy (and Luban’s dignity
argument) seems far less persuasive when the client is a corporation. See LUBAN, supra note 26, at 65–68.
Unless, that is, one can just assume the corporation’s “autonomy” is directly derivative from the individuals who
compose it. But that is a quite dubious assumption. See infra note 51.
37. It is perhaps secondary only to the mechanism of contract.
38. Management perhaps derivatively from ownership, but that question moves us into the conflict of interest
complexities of providing legal services to corporate clients.
39. 2003 MODEL RULES R. 2.1 states that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s
situation.”
40. I have raised this possibility previously. See, e.g., Pepper, Ethics in the Gap, supra note 20, at 192–96;
Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 33, at 1576–80; see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRAN, LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 59 (2d ed. 2009); Heller, infra note 126; Bruce A.
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could also be made to incorporate into the role of corporate management a similar
ethical obligation to take note of and consider ordinary moral consequences and
issues in addition to the primary role specified goals of shareholder value and
profit. There is, however, currently no formal or enforced code or statement of
management ethics that could be supplemented with such an obligation.41 If part
of the problem is that the ordinary moral perspective is not part of the defined role
expectations of either profession, one possible remedy is to redefine one or both
roles to incorporate that obligation. It is not obvious that this possible obligation
should be restricted only to organizational or powerful clients and not also to
individual clients,42 and we will therefore return to it in Parts III. E. 4. and V.,
below, considering possible bridges across the three dichotomies.
c. The Lawyer as Gatekeeper
Over the last ten to twenty years one response to highly publicized cases of
corporate wrongdoing has been to suggest a significantly amplified role for
corporate legal counsel.43 The traditional role is that of instrument for access to
and usage of the law, as long as that usage is itself lawful and facilitates otherwise
lawful conduct. One possibility for a supplemented understanding of ethics for
corporate lawyers is to focus on and elaborate that caveat concerning conduct
“within the law.” The lawyer under this understanding not only provides access to
the law but also limits it: the lawyer functions as facilitator but also as
“gatekeeper,” limiting the corporation’s access to or usage of law when that
conduct is in some substantial way wrongful or unlawful.44 The lawyer becomes,
Green & Russell G. Pearce, Public Service Must Begin At Home: The Lawyer As Civics Teacher In Everyday
Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 1219–24, 1235–36 (2009).
41. In this sense business management is clearly not a traditional profession: no license or admission is
required to practice; no agreed upon or established code of ethics is enforced. See RAKESH KHURANA, FROM
HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 361–68 (2007). To those who have been engaged with
the ethics of law or medicine, Khurana’s faith in the reality and positive effects of formal professionalism can
seem rather naive.
42. There is more concern with lawyer overreaching or domination with individual clients. See Pepper,
Ethics in the Gap, supra note 20, at 192–93.
43. Much of the earlier published material directly addressed the financial reporting scandals of the late
1990s and early 2000s, with a particular focus on Enron. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers,
Ethics and Enron, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 625, 625–630 (Nancy B. Rappaport
& Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (considering the often-overlooked role played by lawyers in the financial
reporting scandals, particularly Enron); Michelle DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business Out of Work
Product, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1883–87 (2011) (examining the debate about an increased role for
corporate legal counsel); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57
BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002) (examining how the Enron fraud was facilitated by auditors, analysts, and
lawyers—those professionals who might be considered well-situated to prevent corporate wrongdoing, rather
than facilitating it as they did).
44. This idea has been the subject of a substantial amount of scholarly debate and analysis. For a more
in-depth examination of this “gatekeeper” concept, see generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 625–630 (2006); Beardslee, supra note 43 at 1883–87; John C.
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to some extent, a supplemental law enforcement mechanism. Beyond just
providing counsel, conversation, and noting possible problems, as in the second
possibility immediately above, this role suggests that sometimes the lawyer
would close the gate and deny access to or use of the law. And this in turn
suggests that the term “gatekeeper” may be a euphemism for police officer or
regulator. Enforcement of a requirement for such a role for corporate lawyers
entails significant and not yet clarified questions.45 This is a quite substantial and
fundamental alteration in the traditionally understood role of the private lawyer,
but one that can seem plausible and attractive. We will return to it in more detail
in our consideration of the second fundamental dichotomy,46 but first, two
possible problems can be briefly noted.
First, trust has traditionally been understood as a primary part of the
professional relationship. The professional is providing assistance in relation to a
particularly important or intimate aspect of the client/patient/customer’s life, and
the service is particularly technical and beyond the understanding of the person in
need. So there is no alternative to trust. The client/patient must first trust the
professional in order to convey the facts of the situation—facts that will not
infrequently be awkward, embarrassing or damaging.47 Then the client/patient
must trust the professional’s knowledge, judgment and skill to provide the needed
assistance. The gatekeeper role is not one that immediately calls to mind a
relationship of trust—to some extent, quite the contrary. One is trying to get
through the gate, but the gatekeeper is there to decide whether or not one is
sufficiently worthy to pass—seemingly an adversary or obstacle as much as a
facilitator.48 Unless, that is, the trust is in the paternal form: the gatekeeper knows
better than I do whether or not I really ought to take my journey in this direction,
Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1305–07 (2003);
Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV. 73, 73–76 (2010); Reinier
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53–61
(1986). As is evident from this work, the notion of the lawyer as “gatekeeper” has been most prevalent in
relation to lawyers for corporations, particularly in regard to securities filings and transactions.
45. There is very little case law dealing with Model Rule 1.13(b) and (c). In fact, the Annotated Rules contain
only two reported cases of discipline for enforcement of Rule 1.13(b) and no cases under Rule 1.13(c). See
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 221–23 (2011).
46. See infra Section II. B.
47. Stephen L. Pepper, Why Confidentiality, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 331 (1998).
48. The troll under the bridge, of course, is one stock cultural image of a not so friendly or helpful
gatekeeper. It is therefore not surprising that support for this concept is far from uniform among scholars or in
the wider legal community. In fact, many have argued strongly that such a fundamental alteration of the role of
the private lawyer is incompatible with a lawyer’s other ethical duties. For an explanation of the controversy, see
Beardslee, supra note 43, at 1883–85. In the wake of the financial reporting scandals, a Congressional effort to
pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (which included a move in the direction of this “gatekeeper” role) was strongly
opposed, most notably by the American Bar Association (“ABA”). Rhode & Paton, supra note 43, at 642–646.
It is frequently argued that many in the legal community believe that “casting lawyers in the role of ethical
gatekeepers will discourage the trust and candor from clients that is essential to effective representation. The
result will be less compliance counseling, not more.” Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1317, 1330 (2006) (explaining the contention before arguing that this concern is ill-founded).
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and I will trust her decisions because she has the requisite professional expertise
and the delegated authority. With the adoption of such a role we would be,
apparently, deciding to delegate such authority to individual private sector
lawyers. Diluting the element of trust might, however, be quite appropriate. The
need for trust is generated by the vulnerability of the client, and our premise here
with powerful corporate clients is that they are not vulnerable in relation to their
lawyers; rather we are all vulnerable to the harm they can do with the assistance
of lawyers. Thus, there is the possible utility of the more independent
“gatekeeper” lawyer role. Corporate managers, the argument has been made,
require legal counsel; they don’t have an alternative. So a role with less trust and
more prophylaxis may well be, in this particular context, a net gain rather than a
loss.
Second, the gatekeeper role seems somewhat implausible given the reality of
the power dynamic between lawyer and client.49 An in-house lawyer is an
employee, both financially dependent on management and with a role conception
of service to the entity and being a member of the “team.” Both the incentive
structure and the psychological realities suggest that it will be difficult for most
lawyers to be genuinely active, alert, independent and willing keepers of the gate.
Outside lawyers seem even less plausible as genuine gatekeepers given the
transformation over the last forty years in: (1) the competition among firms for
the business of large corporations, (2) the mobility from one firm to another
corporations have come to welcome, and (3) the fragmentation of firm usage,
with corporate clients coming to use multiple firms rather than just one, or a very
limited number. All of this combines to weaken the position of the outside lawyer
or firm and make it much less likely that there will be a stable, long term
relationship with any individual firm or lawyer which would support the kind of
independence, trust, and knowledge requisite to an effective and stable gatekeep-
ing role.50
Interestingly, the basic model at the foundation of traditional professional
ethics is intended to remedy just such a dynamic: the temptation on the part of the
relatively powerful professional to exploit the vulnerability and need of the
individual patient/client/customer. If an internalized and weakly enforced
professional ethic works to protect individual patients and clients in the basic
model, it would seem to have at least the potential to work for a corporate
gatekeeper model of lawyer ethics, creating an internalized professional disci-
49. For an examination of these dynamics, see Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 411 (2007), and Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2015) (manuscript at 19–24, 35–37) (on file with author).
50. This would seem to be the basic justification for the creation of the “certified public” accountant: to
prevent accountants from serving the interests of their clients over that of those who rely on their audits in
transacting with those clients. The relatively recent effort to separate the auditing function from consulting and
other services serves the same purpose.
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pline to resist the pull of the surrounding incentive and power structures. It does
seem, however, that the ethical dynamic of helping clients reach their goals may
be fundamentally different than a dynamic of restraining them.
d. Professional Obligation as Rebuttable Presumption
If the premises that sustain the vulnerability justification for professional ethics
are substantially weakened in the ordinary situation of a lawyer serving a large
corporation, is it possible that the applicability of the rules and standards derived
from those premises could be limited to reflect that? It would seem possible to
conclude that, given the weakness of the underlying justification, client
protective rules and standards ought to be defeasible in the case of the
corporation as client.51 The idea would be that the applicability of rules intended
as protective of the client would be rebuttable dependent upon the particular
circumstances. For example, where lawyer-facilitated corporate conduct threat-
ened serious, arguably unjustifiable, harm to third parties (or had already
effectuated such harm), the applicability of a relevant client protective rule—
such as confidentiality—might be rebutted. Both the reasons to allow such
flexibility, and the considerable difficulties of making such an approach
practicable, will be considered in Parts III. E. 2, IV. C. 4, and V. below.
II. THE LAWYER’S PRIMARY ETHICAL ALLEGIANCE: CLIENT AUTONOMY OR
SOME LARGER COMMUNITY ORIENTATION
As noted above in Part I, the dominant understanding of the lawyer’s
obligation is that it is directed primarily to the client. The lawyer’s function is
seen as providing access to the law and that which the law can facilitate and
effectuate for the client’s benefit. The profession as a whole provides access to
the law in the aggregate; but each lawyer does so one client at a time. Ethical
Consideration 7-1 states in part:
The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and the legal system, is to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law, . . . In our government of laws and
not of men, each member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged
and regulated in accordance with the law; to seek any lawful objective through
51.
Interpretation of legal structures as founded on the ideal of individual autonomy alone cannot in
general adequately account for the legal protection of organizational interests. Such legal theories
lead, therefore, to one of two untenable positions. One is the prevailing position that ignores the
existence and distinctive nature of organizations, and applies the body of law derived from the
individual autonomy across the board, to individuals and organization alike . . . .
MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS—A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY
(1986).
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legally permissible means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim,
issue, or defense.52
The lawyer is thus to assist and effectuate the client’s use of the law in service to
the client’s goals and interests, as determined by the client.53 The utility of this
client-primary orientation is usually understood in a kind of “invisible hand”
manner: each client’s self-interested access to the assistance of the law will be a
good thing (when considered in the aggregate with the similar access of others) if
the laws have been well chosen, well designed and well implemented. Thus, for
example, the regimes of contract law and corporation law allow for large scale,
complicated co-operation over time (including, among other benefits, the
long-term relatively reliable aggregation of capital and long-term reliance on the
commitments of others in both large and small scale projects).54 The individual
lawyer is to serve his or her clients (or client) in access to and use of the law. In
the aggregate, that will serve the community or the common good, and the lawyer
therefore need not be concerned that in serving specific clients and their lawful
52. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] (emphasis added).
Ethical Considerations 7-1 through 7-10 provide a coherent vision and guide for a client centered professional
ethic. See MODEL CODE EC 7-1–7-10. The Ethical Considerations were not binding rules; they “constitute[d] a
body of principles upon which the lawyer [could] rely for guidance in many specific situations.” MODEL CODE
Prelim. Statement. The ABA’s replacement, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, initially adopted in 1983,
in some ways retreat from that guide. The opening paragraph of the Preamble to those rules says only that a
“lawyer . . . is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.” 2003 MODEL RULES pmbl. ¶ 1. The ninth paragraph of the Preamble
then says: “Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a
satisfactory living.” 2003 MODEL RULES pmbl. ¶ 9. It notes that in relation to such problems “many difficult
issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.” 2003 MODEL RULES
pmbl. ¶ 9. It provides no reference to such “principles,” however, and no such principles are stated elsewhere in
the rules. At the level of coherent vision or overall guide, the Model Rules thus can appear less client centered
than ECs 7-1 through 7-10. At the level of mandatory rules, however, the Model Rules are, in fact, more client
centered. Rule 1.2(a) gives binding authority to the client to determine the “objectives of representation,”
requires consultation by the lawyer concerning the “means” of reaching those objectives, and gives the client
control over certain specific means related decisions. 2003 MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a). Rule 1.4 requires a great
deal of communication and consultation with the client. 2003 MODEL RULES R. 1.4. The parallel provisions in
ECs 7-7 through 7-9, though more nuanced and elaborate, were not binding rules. MODEL CODE EC 7-7–7-9. In
addition Rule 1.5 gives the client greater protection in regard to fees. See 2003 MODEL RULES R. 1.5.
53. Stephen Gillers has recently summarized the individual lawyer’s obligation as:
[T]o work diligently to achieve a client’s goals within the bounds of the law and professional conduct
rules. No more, no less . . . . Are they willing to work injustice? That may be an uncomfortable
question, but it is not a hard one. Lawyers are agents of their clients before the law and their clients’
fiduciaries. They are not agents of the justice system or of justice.
Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 40
PEPP. L. REV. 365, 368 (2013).
54. Brad Wendel’s view emphasizes the coordination function of the law as a “second order” set of values
underlying the lawyer’s ethical role. See WENDEL, FIDELITY, supra note 15, at 18, 21–22, 86–121.
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goals and interests the consequences might be harmful to third parties or some
larger community interests.
This dominant understanding is far from universal in the profession, however,
and has been subject to critique and suggestions for alternative approaches for at
least several decades. Referring to the common understanding as the “The
Adversary System Excuse,” David Luban argues that when ordinary moral
values (including third party or community interests) are strong and contrary to
the client’s interests, goals, or means, the lawyer should defer to those (in his
view stronger and therefore more legitimate) values and should not facilitate the
client’s contrary access to or use of the law.55 William Simon has argued that the
lawyer’s primary allegiance should be to “legal justice” (that is, the law as
properly and flexibly interpreted in light of both its purposes and the particular
context of application) rather than to the particular client and his, her, or its
interests.56 The second dichotomy can be seen as a division in these two possible
directions: allegiance primarily to the interests and autonomy of the individual
client or, alternatively, primarily to some larger community obligation or
interest.57
This division can also be seen and understood in a more specific way. In my
early exploration of a client-centered, role specific understanding of the
underlying ethical obligations of lawyers, the values of autonomy and equality
were linked to access to law as a justification for lawyers facilitating “amoral”
access to law—that is, on occasion assisting lawful but morally wrongful conduct
by clients.58 This was a moral justification for the dominant understanding of
55. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER (David Luban ed., 1984).
56. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (1988) [hereinafter
Simon, Ethical Discretion]; see also Luban, supra note 55, at 113, 117–18 (“The position I want to press is
roughly that a social institution that can receive only a pragmatic justification is not capable of providing
institutional excuses for immoral acts . . . The adversary system possesses only the slightest moral force, and
thus appealing to it can excuse only the slightest moral wrongs. Anything else that is morally wrong for a
nonlawyer to do on behalf of another person is morally wrong for a lawyer to do as well.”); LUBAN, supra note
26, at 63; Stephen Pepper, Integrating Morality and Law in Legal Practice: A Reply to Professor Simon, 23 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1013–1020 (2010) [hereinafter Pepper, Integrating Morality] (responding to Professor
Simon’s mistake of law example); William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique of
Some Academic Perspectives, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987, 988–89, 989–1001 (2010) [hereinafter Simon, Role
Differentiation] (using a hypothetical of a contributory negligence/comparative negligence statute, the “mistake
of law” example, to illustrate lawyers’ various allegiances); Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra at 1091–1096
(discussing “relative merit” and “internal merit” as criteria guiding lawyers’ conduct).
57. The second dichotomy is thus, to some extent, a correlate of the first: is the client at risk and needing
special allegiance? Or is some larger community at risk, and in need of special protection? The orientation of the
second dichotomy focuses on the primary allegiance of the lawyer rather than on risks or vulnerability—
although the one might be thought to derive from the other.
58. See Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: a Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986).
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lawyers’ ethics.59 The usage of the term or concept of “autonomy” called up for
some readers and commentators a vision of clients as disconnected and separate;
the notion of autonomy for clients was seen as contrary to connection and
community for clients. It is this dichotomy—ethical orientation primarily toward
the client and the client’s autonomy, or primarily toward the obligations and
connections of community—that I want to briefly explore here. We will then turn,
once again, to focus the corporation as client, this time in the context of this
conceptual divide.
A. AUTONOMY AS DISCONNECTION OR AUTONOMY AS CHOICE?
The concept of “autonomy” suggests the client as individual and self-
governing, and this view can appear to see the individual as unconnected to and
separate from others. One of the first insights developed by the communitarian
movement and a foundation of the postmodern understanding, however, is that
the individual is in fact not separate; the individual is constituted by her
connections with others. Biologically and socially, individuals are created by
families and the larger communities and cultures in which those families exist.
We are dependent on others for our very existence initially and for the quality and
substance of our lives throughout.60 Yet we experience ourselves as individuals
making individual choices, choices which sometimes connect us to others, and
sometimes separate us. Looked at from the other side, community does not
ordinarily mean (and need not mean) domination of individual or group
constituents. Community can be, and very often is, facilitative of the flourishing—
and relative independence—of its constituent individuals and groups.
Law can be seen as mediating this need for both connection and separation.61
We need some degree of separation from and protection from others, yet we also
need connection to, cooperation with, and protection by others. Protecting
separation and independence while also facilitating connection and cooperation
is a constant dynamic in the lives of individuals, societies, and the various groups
within society. The highly complicated mass of laws and legal structures is how
59. Because it is based on the value of access to law, it is also an institutional or political justification. See
Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer Knows More Than the Law, 90 TEX. L. REV. 691, 706–07 (2012) [hereinafter
Pepper, More Than the Law] (reviewing WENDEL, FIDELITY, supra note 15).
60. See Stephen Pepper, Autonomy, Community and Lawyers’Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 940–42 (1990)
and sources cited there.
61. This mediation between the need for connection and separation was coined “the fundamental
contradiction” by Duncan Kennedy. Duncan M. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 205, 211–212 (“Most participants in American legal culture believe that the goal of individual
freedom is at the same time dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary
to achieve it.”); see also Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L. J. 1063, 1108 (“This Madisonian tension—between majority
and minority, legislature and court—is just a partial image of the essential and irreconcilable tension between
self and other, between self and self.”).
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we create the uneasy formal mechanisms and compromises by which we try to
balance both needs. Lawyers in turn mediate and facilitate the use of and the
application of this complicated welter that is the law and the structures built and
that can be built with it. Thus, lawyers serve both: separation and individualism,
connection and community. With this foundation there are two observations to
help guide us in understanding this dichotomy (or tension) and to help guide the
lawyer.
1) There could clearly be a continuum of primacy of orientation to either the
individual or some larger community. When the client is an individual person,
the autonomy and choices of that client are usually considered primary. When
the client is itself a group or community—the family or part of a family, a
government unit, civic or business associations of various kinds—that commu-
nal entity or group becomes the primary allegiance of the lawyer. In that case,
the lawyer has the added difficulties of determining who speaks for the group
and what rights and interests of the constituent members must be respected and
in what ways must that respect be manifest. Such considerations and problems
are the grist for the mill of conflict of interest rules and analyses.62 But with
both the individual client and the group or community client, this still leaves
unresolved the question of the extent to which there is a predominant obligation
on the part of the lawyer to some larger community, including the polity or
government or society in general. That is the underlying question of this second
dichotomy: in which direction is the lawyer’s primary allegiance?
2) When the client is an individual it is important for the lawyer to remember
the extent to which individuals are constituted by and connected to their various
communities and groups. While the lawyer may be primarily obligated to assist
the client in reaching her goals and interests as she understands them—that is,
to serve her autonomy—it is often useful to remind the client of her
connections and allegiances (and perhaps to remind her of the ways in which
she may be constituted by them, the ways in which they are part of her and
important to her). Commonly, in serving the client’s autonomy the lawyer is
also, explicitly or implicitly, serving the client in her connections to various
groups and communities.
We choose to get married and consider it a commitment of serious dimension
which significantly limits our range of permissible options and ac-
tions . . . Many of us think or ourselves as Italian or Jewish or Mormon in a
way that has consequences for conduct . . . Or we buy a house assuming that
we will maintain it in a way that will consume resources of time and money,
thereby significantly restraining our future conduct . . . Often restraints and
limits of this sort are a large part of what we mean by community and
62. Conflict of interest is usually the largest section of the required “ethics” or “professional responsibility”
course in law schools; the bulk of litigated cases in the field concern conflicts, as do the greatest number of the
rules. Similarly law firm ethics counsel or committees focus most of their concern on conflict of interest
concerns.
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connection. And it is in this sense that community and connection enhance
autonomy rather than impinge upon it. Connection and community are part
of what we all want, they are part of both who we are and of what we choose,
and the combination is what we usually mean when we speak of “au-
tonomy” . . . [T]he lawyer serves and honors the client’s autonomy by
serving and honoring these restraints.63
Thus, the client often wants to be connected and the lawyer functions to facilitate
that connection. And often the client wants to be both, connected and protected,
and managing that balance is often part of the lawyer’s job.64 Likewise, when
representing a group, organization or community, it is best for the lawyer to take
care to remind those who speak for or have authority for the entity of the
importance of the constituent members of the group, and of the group’s
obligations to and necessary respect for those constituents.
On both sides of the continuum it is therefore important for the lawyer to
remember—and to remind the client about—the other end of the continuum. This
may include reminding the client of the value of following the law even on
occasions when there seems to be little sense or value in doing so.65 A staple of
the lawyer-client counseling relationship should be keeping the dynamic of
connection and separation in mind and assisting the client in being concerned
with both sides. One side or the other may be the focus of the particular issue or
task, but keeping both sides in view is usually helpful, often essential.
B. THE CORPORATION
The corporation is fundamentally different. It is literally a creation of the larger
community and its laws; an artificial entity made possible by the laws of
incorporation. Then, in each instance, it is a creation of a smaller community—a
group of persons (or possibly other corporations)—created (“incorporated”) for
some particular purpose: an abstract, imagined entity brought into being for the
particular purposes of the incorporators. The corporation is instrumental in its
essence, a means for natural persons to reach various ends.66 The respect or
allegiance due to the corporation—to its autonomy in using the law—could
therefore be seen as less than, or at the least fundamentally different from, that
63. Pepper, supra note 60, at 945 (citation omitted). This section of that article further develops the
understanding that “the opposite of autonomy is not connection, relation or community. The opposite of
autonomy is unselected or unaccepted restraint: domination and oppression by others.” Id.
64. A common example: in creating or joining a corporation or other business entity as entrepreneur,
financier, or employee, the client wants both, and manifests both a desire for connection and cooperation and for
protection.
65. See Jamie Heller, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How to Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE
L.J. 2503, 2509 (1994); infra Part IV.C.
66. For a comprehensive look at the topic in relation to legal representation, see generally MILTON C. REGAN,
JR. & JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND CORPORATE PRACTICE (2005).
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due to natural persons.67 The autonomy or dignity68 requisite to an individual is
of fundamental moral and political value. Whether corporations have “au-
tonomy” or “dignity” in the sense that individuals do—or the extent to which
they ought to—are difficult questions. That difficulty could be seen as relevant to
a lawyer’s obligation to the corporate entity as a client.69 Given that the
corporation is not a real person, but rather an instrumental creation—first of the
polity and then of the various constituents (incorporators, directors, officers,
employees)—it would seem that the lawyer’s obligation to the corporation (and
the autonomy, respect, or allegiance it is due) could be, and perhaps ought to be,
significantly lessened or altered. The respect due to the “autonomy” of the
corporation would seem to be derivative from the respect due the persons
constituting the corporation. Limits put upon the allegiance of a lawyer for a
corporation—either by rules or by more general ethical understandings—would
then be part of the expectations of the persons constituting and using the
corporate entity.70
Under this view we could structure an understanding—or rules—by which the
lawyer’s allegiance to the corporation—what the lawyer can do for the
corporation—is more limited than what the lawyer can do in serving an
67. Consider the Kantian imperative: treat persons only as ends, not as means. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 80 (Mary J. Gregor ed. and trans., 1996) (1785). A
corporation, however, is in its nature only a set of means. From this perspective, treating it as an end seems a
confusion. Cf. n.51, supra. This is similar to a broader common confusion: money (or material well-being) and
freedom from restraint are, for the most part, means not ends. We want them because they are instrumental to
obtaining other things we want more.
68. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 26, at 67–95.
69. See, e.g., Susan Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115,
144–45 (2006); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System,
98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 1005 (2000) (“[P]art of the unified appearance of the legal system across these different
spheres comes from a failure to attend closely enough to the misapplication to economic entities of ideas rooted
in conceptions of justice for members of a democracy.”). This would appear to be a related insight to that of
Meir Dan-Cohen quoted at supra note 51.
70. This proposition should not depend on one’s conclusion concerning different ways of understanding the
fundamental nature or obligations of corporations. As Donald Langevoort puts it:
The easier question, for me, is whether the corporation has the right or freedom to act as anything
other than a wealth-generator for its stakeholders (which to most corporations means its sharehold-
ers). This is certainly one of the great debates in corporate theory, with Milton Friedman as the
canonical citation that it does not, and Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel as evangelists for the view
that the profit-maximizing constraint extends even to compliance with the law.
Today, however, this debate has largely run out of steam. To those who believe that natural persons
have moral obligations of any sort, it is difficult to accept that these obligations could be deflected by
the consensual act of investment in a legal entity and delegation to professional managers. The more
sophisticated view—that organizations take on characteristics separate and distinct from its
stakeholders—lends itself naturally to a moral theory of distinct corporate rights and responsibilities.
Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and Good Corporate
Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1618–19 (2006) (citations omitted). Some of those distinct rights and
responsibilities could relate to limits on the lawyers obligation to a corporate client that differ from those due to
an individual person or group of persons.
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individual. Such a limitation could be included in our understanding of what a
corporation is, how it is permitted to accomplish its objectives, and in the
articulation of the rules for creating a corporation. In this way, the lawyer might
be obligated toward serving the larger community when serving the corporation
in a way she is not when serving an individual.71 The commonly accepted
understanding of the degree of allegiance owed by a lawyer is quite extreme. As
long as the goal of the client and the means used to reach it are within the bounds
of the law, the lawyer may facilitate conduct that is harmful to innocent third
parties or harmful to the larger community interest.72 We could require that a
lawyer serving a corporation take such harm into account in determining what
conduct in service to the corporation’s interests is acceptable. Such an approach
might be considered appropriate not just because of the artificial and derivative
nature of corporations, but also because of the vastly greater power and wealth
that can be acquired by a corporation in relation to that possible for individuals.
As discussed above, corporations are problematic because of both this vastly
greater power and because of the role-specific morality of those responsible for
their conduct and management.73 How one would draft such guidance, how one
would conceive of and articulate such a limit, would present very difficult
problems. But such problems would seem surmountable.74 One limited require-
ment might be to simply require the lawyer to bring such harms and risks to the
attention of the corporate decision makers and discuss them and alternatives in
light of the special nature, power, risks and obligations of the corporate entity.75
III. RULES OR DISCRETION, CHARACTER AND JUDGMENT
The professional relationship involves some risk, some potential wrongdoing,
that calls up the necessity for some special structure in response—the mechanism
and obligations of professionalism—in addition to the ordinary requirements of
customary practices and of the civil and criminal law. Quite different conceptions
of that primary risk are the focus of the first dichotomy explored above in Part I.
71. See infra Part IV. A., and C. for illustrations of situations where this might be appropriate. Part IV. C. 2.
sketches the possibility of a heightened obligation on corporations to comply with the law and a consequent
possible ethical obligation on lawyers in regard to advising corporate clients.
72. See Gillers, supra note 53, at 368–369.
73. See discussion supra Part I.C.
74. See infra part III. E. 3. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 25–30; William H. Simon, Organizational
Representation and the Frontiers of Gatekeeping, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1069 (2011); William
H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (2006–2007); William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron Identity Crisis of the
Business Lawyer, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 947 (2005–2006); Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as Public
Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 284–88 (1990). See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between
Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615 (2006);
Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology,
Culture and Ethics of Financial Risk-Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209 (2011).
75. For further discussion of the possibility of such counseling with clients, see infra Parts III.E.4. and IV.
1096 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 28:1069
The second dichotomy is concerned with the question of the primary ethical
orientation of the lawyer. The third dichotomy focuses not on different
conceptions of the risk but on the remedy. What is the best approach for
structuring the obligations of professionalism and professional ethics to create a
prophylaxis for that risk? Or to effectuate that primary obligation? What tools do
we create for the profession or professionals to prevent or remedy the potential
wrongful conduct we anticipate? There are many ways to cut or conceptualize
this particular pie, but I want to focus here on a quite fundamental difference that
usually lays under the surface, or is considered explicitly only as a matter of
applying the particular approach that has already been assumed or chosen. Do we
want lawyers primarily following rules as their guides for ethical professional
behavior? Or would it be preferable for lawyers to make ethical choices in
reliance on their character, virtues, and skills of moral discernment and
deliberation, aside from the following of a rule?76
On the surface it appears that rules dominate both the discourse and the
practice of lawyers’ ethics. A very large number of interrelated rules have been
drafted and adopted,77 and an administrative regime of multiple employees and
some substantial financing operates in every state to enforce those rules on
practicing lawyers. Academic writing on lawyers’ ethics also focuses primarily
upon the rules: what they should contain, how they are best interpreted or
understood, how lawyers’ understand them or are guided by them, how and if
they are enforced, and so on. But it is possible that this focus on rules may be
misleading. When lawyers are engaged in the actual work of practicing law and
interacting with clients and others, it is probable that they relatively rarely consult
the rules or think in terms of the rules.78 In regard to actual conduct and
reflection, it may well be that it is usually their judgment,79 without explicit
reference to rules, which dominates and determines conduct. It is also probably
76. It should be noted that any discussion approaching rules as potentially guiding or limiting conduct has
rejected, at least implicitly, the critical legal studies critique of rules suggesting that they are completely illusory
and indeterminate. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1703 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 427–29 (1985). The extent
to which the critique has some truth compared to the extent to which it is an exaggeration is beyond the scope of
the examination in this article of the potential use of rules for the guidance of lawyers’ professional conduct.
77. There are fifty-seven primary rules in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, most of them
containing multiple separate rules and parts. Model Rule 1.5 on fees, for example, has five major sub-rules, the
fourth part (d) containing two distinctly different prohibitions. See MODEL RULES R. 1.5. Rule 1.13, mentioned
above, contains seven major sub-rules. MODEL RULES R. 1.13. The total number of rules is thus well above one
hundred, and probably somewhere in the hundreds.
78. See, e.g., Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, Do Codes of Ethics Actually Shape
Legal Practice?, 45 MCGILL L.J. 645, 653–656 (2000) (finding that in a study of 154 lawyers in Ontario only
16% referred to Ontario’s professional ethics handbook when answering questions about problem-solving in
their practices); Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 75–76
(1999); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 392–94 (1989).
79. That judgment may be based on the ethical perceptions, habits and assumptions of the particular
lawyer—in other words, on that lawyer’s character and virtues. See infra Part III.C. Or it may result more from
2015] THREE DICHOTOMIES 1097
true that in some areas of relatively well-understood rule-backed obligations,
lawyers often function on the basis of a guide that resembles a principle more
than a rule. For example, lawyers generally understand, feel bound by, and follow
the obligation of client confidentiality, but they do so on that vague, general level
of understanding—at the level of a principle or standard—rather than on the
precise terms of the rules. They navigate the space and tension between the very
broad and inclusive obligation of confidentiality understood by the profession
and articulated by the rule (“shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client”) and the broad permission to reveal and use
information in service to the client (“unless . . . disclosure is impliedly authorized
in order to carry out the representation”) on the basis of their day-to-day intuition
and judgment, usually unarticulated and not reflected upon, and without
reference to or conscious awareness of the particular terms of the rules.80
Disclosures not in service to the client will be avoided (if noticed), but likely
without looking up the rules, except in quite extraordinary situations where there
is some strong reason suggesting disclosure. Similarly, lawyers are aware of and
feel obligated by the general obligation to avoid conflicts of interest with clients,
but they rarely consult the particular terms of the quite dense set of rules that
govern conflicts.81 Thus, rules appear to dominate, as would be consistent with
one’s intuition concerning lawyers, but in actual practice the lawyer’s judgment
and character (often guided by general principles) may well be the more frequent
determinant of conduct.
It should also be noted that any set or regime of rules can be said to have made
the decision between a rules based decision and a decision based on character,
context, happenstance, pressures, and interests of the lawyer and those effected by and witnessing the conduct or
decision. See infra Part III D.6. Or from a combination of both.
80. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(a). Note the remarkably broad scope of required confidentiality; there is no
requirement that the protected information be actually secret, confidential, or generally not known; no
requirement that it come from the client, or that there be a request for confidentiality. The Restatement, to the
contrary, excludes “information that is generally known.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 59 (2000).
William Simon’s theory of lawyers’ ethics is an argument for principles in general rather than rules
(preferring “non-categorical” decision-making by lawyers), but he tends to be thinking of general legal
principles (“justice”) rather than ones more closely connected to the rules that I am referring to here. See
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 9 (1998) [hereinafter SIMON,
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE].
[T]he lawyer should take such actions as, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular
case, seem likely to promote justice . . . . The essence of this approach is contextual judgment—a
judgment that applies relatively abstract norms to a broad range of the particulars of the case at hand.
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 9 (1998) [hereinafter SIMON,
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE]; see also Simon, Role Differentiation, supra note 56, at 1001–03; Pepper, Integrating
Morality, supra note 56, at 1021–24; Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 56, at 1090–91.
81. On the occasions when large firms consult those rules, they frequently do so through their ethics
committees, ethics partner, or general counsel. In such instances a group of lawyers are consulting the rules
through the proxies designated by the firm for that function.
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judgment, and discretion on a situation by situation basis (or, more precisely,
category of situations by category of situations). In those situations in which a
rule seems best, a rule has been promulgated; in those situations in which
discretion seems more likely more often to reach the better result, a rule has not
been formulated, leaving the particular decision-maker free to decide. For
example, Rule 1.2(a) gives the client authority to decide objectives, but requires
the lawyer only to “consult” with the client as to means. Thus, in the generality of
matters, it is in the lawyer’s discretion whether or not to have the client decide a
question of means.82 The final two sentences of the rule however, provide a brief
list of questions of means in which the lawyer “shall abide” by the client’s
decisions, substituting a rule for the lawyer’s discretion. For example: “A lawyer
shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”83 Thus this decision
can be made at the level of the specific: should there be rules for confidentiality?
For conflicts of interest? Or at even greater levels of particularity: should there be
a rule or discretion in regard to confidentiality in situations of possible serious
harm to third parties? The following discussion focuses more on the larger scale
question of which might be, in general, more appropriate for the situation of
lawyers. Even assuming one decided that discretion was more appropriate, in
general, there would likely be a few situations where it would be preferable to
have a rule. And, as just noted, even in the current situation of a regime of
lawyers’ ethics dominated by a rules based approach, there are significant areas
left for discretion.84 Another example is that almost all of the exceptions to the
obligation of confidentiality are expressed in permissive language, thus leaving
revelation, or not, to the discretion of the lawyer. Rule 1.6(b), the prefatory
passage to a list of six numbered exception, begins: “A lawyer may reveal . . . .”85
Thus, there will always be some matters left to discretion, and very likely at least
some rules. The question pursued here is which should be primary, which should
be the generality, as the guide for most decisions of lawyers’ ethics—rules or
discretion guided by judgment and character?
What follows is a brief summary of the strengths and weaknesses of rules
followed by a similar discussion concerning character and discretion, each
examined in the context of lawyers’ ethics.
82. This, of course, can often be a consequential decision. A student working in a criminal defense clinic told
me of going to trial in a case where everyone thought on the facts they should win—the evidence was very weak
and disputed. Her supervising professor suggested during jury selection disqualifying a prospective juror,
saying: “He’s a convictor and he’s a leader.” They were consulting with the client on jury selection, however.
Having heard the supervisor’s opinion, the defendant client said he liked that juror and wanted him on the jury.
The lawyers under Rule 1.2 had the discretion to make a contrary decision, but they exercised their discretion to
follow the client’s preference. The man became the foreman of the jury, and the jury, to everyone’s surprise,
convicted.
83. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a).
84. See Bruce A. Green & Fred Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265,
276–77 (2006).
85. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(b) (emphasis added).
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A. THE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGES OF RULES86
Rules are relatively accessible. When there is an issue as to how to act, which
alternative to take, if there is an applicable rule, you can look it up. There is no
need to think through the situation as deeply or as widely as in the absence of a
rule; no need to find out more policy related facts, seek out other opinions or
consult with either those with expertise or good judgment. No need for research
beyond looking it up. There are, of course, often questions of interpretation and
application—the normal grist for the lawyer’s mill. In many situations this will
involve further fact gathering and investigation, the exercise of judgment in
application, all of which can be quite problematic or elaborate, as first year law
students come to understand. Still, all this is likely to be far more limited, far less
elaborate and difficult, than the wide-open field—the far larger range of
possibilities—encountered in the absence of a rule.
Rules are predictable. Because they are written and relatively brief and simple,
the required conduct can be determined in advance. This is to some extent a
corollary of the accessibility of rules.
Because they are predictable and accessible, rules allow for coordination and
cooperation among varied persons and groups.87 Reliance among strangers and
across relatively long periods of time becomes possible. Knowing the rules of
contracts and corporations, for example, allows for complicated structures of
cooperation among large groups of persons and organizations.
Also because they are accessible and predictable, rules provide a barrier to
arbitrary decision-making and to arbitrary authority. Rules provide a reason
other than impulse, self-interest, convenience, whim or intuition on the part of the
decision maker. They also provide the decision-maker with shelter from the
exercise of arbitrary authority by others.
Rules are thus also authoritative and reliable in the sense that they rest on
something relatively objective and in place prior to the particular occasion for
their use. They do not rest just on the opinion, interest, impulse or intuition of the
decision maker. They also do not rest on the opinion, impulse, intuition, or
arbitrary decision of some authority over the decision-maker. It is possible, of
course, for the rule itself to have been based upon the interest, impulse or
arbitrariness of the rule maker.
Rules are efficient. The analysis underlying the framing of a rule or set of rules
can be done once, and need not be replicated every time a decision presents itself.
The problem can be thought through and investigated thoroughly once; requisite
86. Compare FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (2d ed.1993) (providing an extended consideration of, and justification
for, the use of rules), with LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001) (providing a more skeptical exploration of the same questions).
87. See SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 164–66; WENDEL, FIDELITY, supra note 15, at 106–07.
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or helpful research and consideration can be done once. Each decision-maker
need not do the work again each time; need not invest time and effort in research
and analysis for all the factors relevant to this category of situations. A rule once
framed serves for multiple decisions until it is revoked or reframed. Time and
effort are saved.88
Rules allow for higher quality in the rule itself through higher quality in the
process by which it is created than is likely to occur on the situation-by-situation
occasion of each individual decision. The rule can be drafted by experts with the
appropriate information and preparation, or such experts can contribute to
the process. Collective wisdom and collective process can contribute. Creation of
the rule can be an occasion for reasoned deliberation concerning what the
obligations and responsibilities ought to be under the circumstances. The rule and
its bases and reasons can be thought through and considered carefully by those
with various forms of relevant knowledge and interest.
Rules can be created through fair procedures (in turn created by fair rules for
creating such procedures). Since rules are efficient in that they only need to be
created once, but then are to be used in large number of subsequent applications,
there is justification for investing substantial time in creating fair and rational
procedures for constructing and adopting the rules.
As a result, the rule itself is more likely to seen as fair and just if the process for
creation and application are seen as transparent and fair. In addition rules offer
the promise of uniformity of application and hence the appearance of equal
treatment.
B. THE SUBSTANTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF RULES
Rules are generalizations and approximations. Inevitably they will be both
under-inclusive and over-inclusive in relation to their purposes. The infinite
variety of human behavior and interaction, the difficulty of prediction, and the
very nature of generalization mean that the results dictated by a rule in any
particular situation may well be wrong. Frequently wrong even as judged by the
purposes or intentions underlying the rule itself; or wrong from a broader, more
general perspective than the specific purposes or function of the rule. The
fifty-five mile per hour speed limit on a particular stretch of highway at a
particular time may be too high or too low in light of optimum safety and
efficiency. The obligation to comply with the terms of a legally enforceable
contract may turn out to be, under the particular circumstances, unfair or unjust to
one of the parties, either in general or from the perspective of the parties at the
88. “It is a profoundly erroneous truism . . . that we should cultivate the habit of thinking about what we are
doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations
which we can perform without thinking about them.” SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 146 n.14 (quoting Alfred
North Whitehead).
2015] THREE DICHOTOMIES 1101
time of entering into the agreement.89
Rules are also rigid and relatively mechanical—they bend relatively little to
the particular circumstances. Rules prevent recourse to all the particular relevant
facts, values and intentions making up the situation presenting the need for a
decision. That is the cost attendant to the advantages of rules listed above. We
have all experienced the wooden, unthinking bureaucrat applying a rule where it
makes no sense. In such contexts rules do not seem so much a barrier to arbitrary
and unfair decision-making (see part III. A. above) as arbitrary and unfair in
themselves. From this perspective, rules entail the added significant problem of
the decision-maker avoiding responsibility: “The rule made me do it.” And yet
this is frequently part of the purpose of many rules or regimes of rules: to take
discretion away from the persons making the immediate decision and applying
the rule. The judgment of the rule-maker is preferred over that of the on the spot
decision-maker.90
The cost of the multiple potential benefits of rules listed above is that they
frequently get the answer, the result of application of the rule, substantively
wrong given the full context of any particular situation. In regard to rules, the
values of procedure and substance are thus often in conflict: the procedure of
deciding by rules has many advantages, but not infrequently the particular
substantive result may well be wrong from a perspective more broad and
inclusive than that of the rule itself. Because moral questions (including
questions of professional ethics) are often too complex and multifaceted to lend
themselves to rule-bound solutions, they are particularly subject to this difficulty.91
Lawyers are particularly well situated to experience and appreciate this
tension. They work with and are experts in the use of rules and thus are likely to
have direct and repeat experience of the limits of rule application to specific
circumstances. When working with the particular application of a rule, they are
89. “Rule-based decision-making thereby entails an inevitable under- and over-inclusiveness, and accepting
a regime of rules necessitates tolerating some number of wrong results—results other than those that would
have been reached by the direct and correct application of the substantive justifications undergirding the rule.”
SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 135 (summarizing the first six chapters of the book). Or, as Alexander and Sherwin
put it: “[t]his bluntness of rules is therefore both morally desirable and morally problematic . . . . [T]he results
they dictate will diverge from those that particularism, applied correctly, would dictate.” ALEXANDER &
SHERWIN, supra note 86, at 35.
90. SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 150, 151–55 (“Often we fear that some class of decision-makers, whether
through unconscious bias or conscious ill-will, cannot be trusted to take certain types of factors into account.”).
Some not insignificant number of lawyers may not be trusted to resist the temptation and opportunity to exploit
the vulnerability of their unsophisticated individual clients. Others might not be trusted to resist the rewards and
pressures presented by their powerful, often corporate, clients to assist in conduct unjustifiably harmful to third
parties or social interests. See discussion supra Parts I.A–C.
91. See, e.g., Stuart Hampshire, Public and Private Morality, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 48–53 (Stuart
Hampshire ed., 1978); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 909 (1996); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional
Conduct: Saltwater for Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311, 328–31 (1987); Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues
and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 40 (2000).
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likely to know the full facts and relevant nuances of a current situation far more
than a remote rule-maker deciding far in advance and without knowledge of all
the particularities. The lawyer is thus in a position to appreciate the frequent
discontinuity between the purposes of a rule and its effect in an actual particular
application. Lawyers are likely to understand the nature of rules as rough
generalities made in advance for general purposes, and therefore not infrequently
leading to “wrong” results (even in light of those purposes) in any given
instance.92
C. JUDGMENT, CHARACTER AND THE EXERCISE OF PRACTICAL REASON
AND DISCRETION
If rules too often reach the wrong substantive conclusion; if life is too complex
for rules to provide sufficient ethical guidance; is there a more promising basis
for the ethical choices entailed in the practice of law? If we imagine for a moment
a lawyer with both good judgment and good character, would ethical choices
based on the discretion of such a lawyer more reliably reach the right ethical
result than choices derived from and bound by a set of predetermined ethical
rules? Would making an “all things considered” judgment on the basis of
educated practical reason work better than a decision based on the applicable rule
or rules?
A combination of good judgment and good character is what is usually meant
by neo-Aristotelian thinkers when they discuss practical wisdom or practical
reason. It is based on a combination of experience, mentoring, and knowledge.93
Character in this usage means a combination of values and virtues that have been
acquired as much from experience and practice as from study, and that as a result
of experience and practice the exercise and application of these values and virtues
has become a matter of habit. Judgment means the ability to reason and intuit
one’s way to a conclusion based on a combination of experience, virtues, values
and knowledge (exercising a combination of both rational and emotional
intelligence). In this conception, good lawyers (good persons) exercising
educated ethical deliberation would be able to deal with the complexity of human
interaction and the multiplicity of relevant factors far more flexibly and
92. It is in this aspect of rules (and, thus, most law) that Professor Wendel’s conception of law misses an
important point. The moral reason for not applying a particular rule or law often has nothing to do with
reopening or rearguing its basic premises, justifications, or compromises. It may well be that with all those
directly in mind, in this particular instance the rule doesn’t work to serve those premises, justifications or
compromises. Both the fifty-five miles per hour speed limit and the unfair contract, mentioned three paragraphs
above would be examples of such situations. See Pepper, More Than the Law, supra note 59, at 699. I believe
the same criticism applies to the position of Professor Dare in TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENCE
OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 103–08 (2009).
93. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 185–88, 272 (1973); JEFFREY
STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS 269 (1988); Hampshire,
supra note 91, at 38–39.
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effectively than lawyers constrained by rules. Lawyers under this model would
have developed the character and the virtues necessary for them to perceive
ethical choices as they arose in their practices.94 They would understand the
values and appropriate role of the profession under the particular circumstances,
and have the ability to deliberate and come to an ethically appropriate conclusion
as to their conduct.
It is an attractive vision. It is seriously, movingly, and often persuasively
portrayed in literature and popular culture.95 A different branch of neo-
Aristotelian ethics explores and attempts to analyze this as narrative ethics—the
ethics of stories.96 But can it work well enough and reliably enough in actual
practice to supplant rules as the primary day-to-day guide for lawyers? There are
at least six serious difficulties to be anticipated in a possible shift from rules to
character, discretion and practical reason.
D. SIX PROBLEMS WITH DISCRETION AND PRACTICAL REASON
1) The first difficulty is that lawyers may not be well prepared or well-educated
for such analysis and deliberation. Neither law school nor most undergraduate
experience is likely to focus on ethics. Very few lawyers are undergraduate
philosophy or psychology majors; not many have taken a college course in moral
philosophy or moral psychology, or remember much about it if they did. Most
law students are not trained in reasoned deliberation about questions of right and
wrong (that is, moral philosophy or ethics). The required ethics or legal
profession courses may touch on this, and a few may attempt to go into some
depth, but the usual course focuses on the rules, and on analysis of and
94. The ability to see—to notice an ethical question—is a key moral virtue; you have to notice an ethical
question before you can think about it. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Belonging, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
703, 706 (1988); Stephen L. Pepper, How to do the Right Thing: A Primer on Ethics and Moral Vision in GOOD
BUSINESS (James O’Toole and Don Mayer, eds., Routledge (2010)). But there are often built in difficulties to this
ability. See sources cited infra note 115 (exploring the psychology of moral decision-making).
95. See William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular Culture, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 421, 421–25,
431–34 (2001). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can They Do That? Legal Ethics in Popular Culture: Of
Character and Acts, 48 UCLA L. REV 1305, 1315–25 (2001) (examining the popular portrayal of our “lawyer
heroes” who “seek to serve the ends of justice” and how the portrayal has changed over the last fifty years).
Menkel-Meadow concludes that in “movies and on television good lawyer character just as often demonstrates
a departure from the rules of law in the name of a greater justice, as it does conformity to it.” Id. at 1325.
96. See, e.g., Robert Atkinson, How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of the
Remains of the Day, 105 YALE L.J. 177, 192 n.82, 217 nn. 206 & 209 (1995); Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics
of Belonging, 49 OHIO STATE L. J. 703, 703 (1988). See generally Paul LeBel, The Stewardship of Lawyering:
Lessons From a Visit to Wendell Berry’s Port William, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815 (2003). Professor Shaffer extols
narrative ethics, in part, as follows:
I find it useful to read, think and talk about stories. Stories display morals more than announce them.
They involve quandaries, but they put quandaries in a narrative human context. The context cuts the
quandary down to size. A story helps give the quandary an appropriate amount of weight, that is, the
weight it has in life.
Thomas Shaffer, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS xxix (1985).
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application of those rules. To the extent the required courses are branching out at
some schools, they seem to be moving toward a descriptive sociology of the
diversity of possible practice settings and constraints more than a turn toward
ethics or practical reason.97 Because ethical deliberation is difficult (and often
awkward or pressured under the practical circumstances of lawyer-client
relationships) and lawyers are neither trained for nor experienced in it, many if
not most may be reluctant to enter into the effort. They may well prefer the
simplicity of rules. In addition, such analysis is time consuming, and time
remains most lawyers’ stock in trade. Lawyers are likely to be reluctant to bill for
time spent in ethical deliberation and clients resistant to paying for it. It is
possible, however, that this concern is exaggerated. Ethical analysis is to some
extent habitual and intuitive to each of us, part of our common culture. What we
are considering here is making it somewhat more open, explicit and reasoned in
the context of lawyer decision-making. And as noted in sub-section (4) below,
there is a great deal of ethical consensus in our culture.
2) The second difficulty is that character, at least as understood from a
neo-Aristotelian view of ethics (more commonly referred to as “virtue ethics”),
requires a community and an established, functioning practice of that community
from which character and professional practical wisdom are to be developed and
nurtured.98 Many would observe that lawyers in the U.S. for the most part
probably do not have a sufficient community or a sufficient “practice” to support
an ethics of character and virtues.99 At least in large firm elite practice, it has been
argued, high billable hour requirements and high salaries have created a culture
that is too destructive to the mentoring relationships and the values necessary to
develop, educate and support character.100 This may be part of the reason why
97. Leading examples are new required first year courses at the University of Indiana and the University of
California, Irvine. For a description of the Indiana course, see MAURER SCHOOL OF LAW DOCTOR OF
JURISPRUDENCE (JD), http://law.indiana.edu/degrees/jd/curriculum.shtml (last visited March 294, 2015); for the
Irvine course, see Ann Southworth & Catherine L. Fisk, Our Institutional Commitment to Teach about the Legal
Profession, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 73 (2011). There is also a nascent movement toward incorporating a focus on
student development of a professional identity, in the direction of practical wisdom, in some law schools. See,
e.g., Daisy Hurst Floyd, Practical Wisdom: Reimagining Legal Education, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 195 (2013);
Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, Legal Education’s Ethical Challenge: Empirical Research on How Most
Effectively to Foster Each Student’s Professional Formation (Professionalism), 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 2 (2011).
98. MACINTYRE, supra note 93; STOUT, supra note 93.
99. See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel, Ethics: Beyond the Rules—Questions and Possible Responses, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 875, 879–81 (1998); Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 33, at 1608–09 (describing
Thomas Shaffer’s experience of being mentored in an elite law firm decades ago, and how that may well be a far
less likely experience now and in more recent decades); Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite
Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705,
729–44 (1998).
100. See Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and
Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 915–18 (1999). For a critique of a similar ethos at Goldman Sachs,
see Greg Smith, Op-Ed., Why I am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, at A27 (critiquing the
focus on profit from rather than service to clients).
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some have turned to specific practice areas—say securities or family law—as the
appropriate locus for the creation of lawyers’ ethics.101 Not only may it allow for
more specific and appropriate rules, but the smaller scale and the common
practice context may allow for a more genuine community to support the
development of character, virtues, judgment and practical reason. As we are
reminded by the behavior leading to the 2008 economic collapse and to the prior
debacle of the Enron era, lawyers serving large corporations may well work in a
culture of greed and exploitation of the vulnerabilities of others.102 That seems
unpromising soil in regard to developing a culture to support an ethics of
character and discretion. If we move the focus to practice outside of the large elite
firms, there may be less pressure, but probably not less temptation (just less
sizable temptation). There does not seem to be much to indicate that lawyers in
this sector of the profession103 have the developed communities and “practices”
in the neo-Aristotelian sense sufficient to support the necessary development of
character, virtues and judgment to any greater extent than have large firms. We
could of course rely on character in a more generic and less Aristotelian
sense—what we ordinarily mean by character in common usage. This, however,
leads to a large problem in regard to variety of result, discussed immediately
below.
3) The third problem is that of moral pluralism. As noted above, law is a public
good intended to be available to all, and the function of the legal profession is to
provide access to that public good. The law any particular person or organization
gets access to should be the same law, relatively neutral and uniform across the
spectrum of lawyers. It ought not depend on the particularities of the lawyer one
happens to consult.104 If there is no common professional community and
therefore no common ethical tradition to guide lawyers in providing access,
however, a method that relies on the varied character, virtues, and judgment of
individual lawyers will eventuate in access to the law being equally varied. For
example, one client may have a lawyer willing to cross-examine to cast doubt on
101. See Leslie Levine & Lynn Mather, Why Context Matters, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION
MAKING IN CONTEXT (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather, eds., 2012); Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The
Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 DUKE L. J. 1243, 1252–56 (2014) and sources cited there.
102. See, for example, reports of the Lehman Brothers quarterly financial statement manipulations prior to
the bankruptcy (involving “materially misleading” accounting practices to hide debt), which must have been
facilitated to some extent by lawyers. See Pepper, More Than the Law, supra note 59, at 702 and sources cited
there.
103. Cf. HEINZ, ET AL., supra note 10, at 95–97.
104. At least one scholar disagrees on this point:
I do not think it all bad that the kind of advice clients get depends to some extent on the chance of
whom they choose or have chosen for them as lawyers. That kind of chance happens all through life
with the chance of whom we wind up with as parents, children, priests, ministers or rabbis, teachers,
friends, and leaders.
Andrew L. Kaufman, A Commentary on Pepper’s “The Lawyer’s Amoral Role”, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
651, 655 (1986).
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the truthfulness of a witness known by both lawyer and client to be telling the
truth, while another client’s lawyer in the same situation may well find such
conduct morally unacceptable under the circumstances and not pursue that course
of cross-examination.105 The legal process available to different clients then has
become unequal; it will vary substantially with the character and ethics of the
particular lawyer. The application of rules, while certainly not uniform, is likely
to be more uniform than is the discretion and judgment of individual lawyers.106
But it must also be remembered that having more uniform results may not, in the
context of rule application, mean the results are better.107 Judgments reached on
the character, judgment and deliberation of different lawyers might vary, but they
might also be better moral decisions for the most part.
4) The fourth problem is the frequent lack of a larger community of cohesion
and support for an ethics of character and judgment (practical wisdom). Not only
is there no reliable professional community to support character ethics in the
neo-Aristotelian sense, but also for many lawyers and law students there is also
no external community to develop and support an ethics of character and virtue.
This problem can be exaggerated, however. I have argued that there is more
ethical consensus than is commonly recognized.108 On the political hot-button
issues there certainly is not, but that is why they draw so much attention, why
they are, or become, the “wedge” issues that divide us. But on the ordinary
questions of everyday morality there is generally consensus: all other things
being equal, we should repay our just debts;109 we should avoid harm to innocent
persons absent some sufficient justification for such harm; truthfulness is
ordinarily better than deception, absent some particular justification; and so on.
For any morally difficult situation there may be differences of opinion or
conclusion as to what is sufficient justification. But many situations are not
difficult. And for those that are, having a consensus agreement on the foundation
values and basic moral obligations moves one far down the path toward an agreed
upon answer.110 So while many or most lawyers may not be deeply connected to a
105. Pepper, Ethics in the Gap, supra note 20, at 189–90 (1998).
106. Some might counter that sub-communities of lawyers—family law practitioners or securities
lawyers—might provide a community for this function. But it seems unlikely that such groups have a
sufficiently cohesive and coherent “practice” to provide consistent ethical guidance.
107. See discussion supra Part III.B (on the disadvantages of rules).
108. See Pepper, Ethics in the Gap, supra note 20, at 197–99.
109. The disagreement over the moral acceptability of strategic mortgage default appears to depend on
whether one believes all other factors are equal: “the expectation of the parties may not have included further
repayment beyond giving up the home upon default, and there may be far less than clean hands on the part of the
financial institutions that initiated and now hold the debt.” Pepper, More Than the Law, supra note 59, at 701
nn.49–50.
110. Reasoning toward such answers in specific situations, taking into account previous similar or analogous
situations and all relevant factors, is a method of philosophical analysis sometimes categorized as casuistry. See,
e.g., ALBERT JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1990).
Telling the story of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
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community which provides a moral tradition or moral support, there remains a
large reservoir of general community agreement on most moral issues: don’t
cheat; don’t deceive; don’t cause needless pain; and so on.
5) The fifth difficulty is that lawyers are not disinterested in regard to their
clients. Lawyers are making a living from their work for clients, and the amount
may vary to a significant extent as a result of the ethical choices made by the
lawyer. In addition, the lawyer is to a greater or lesser extent involved in the life
of the client and identified with the client. The lawyer’s work life is intertwined
with the client’s concerns: in terms of emotions and hassles, the lawyer is not
objective or removed. All of this makes the exercise of good judgment—practical
wisdom—more difficult. Lawyers’ entanglement with their clients and the
dependence of their own financial interests to some extent on their clients tend
toward making their ethical vision and decisions less reliable. It is difficult to
think clearly and disinterestedly when we are in fact connected and interested; the
human capacity for self-deception and for not noticing is clearly substantial and
often difficult to overcome.111 This is why we seek advisors less involved in a
situation than are we; why we often seek the guidance of friends. And this circles
us back to the fundamental reasons underlying the concept of professionalism
developed in Part I above. The lawyer sometimes will be tempted to maximize
income from service to the client rather than put the client’s interests first (that is,
exploit the client’s vulnerability). Or, alternatively, the lawyer sometimes will be
swayed by the powerful client to facilitate conduct harmful to an innocent third
party (or assist in other morally dubious conduct) in service to that client’s
financial interests. The better the client does financially, the better it is likely to be
financially for the lawyer. The more the lawyer is perceived as helpful and “on
board,” the less the lawyer is the squeaky wheel, the more positively the lawyer is
likely to be perceived by the client. This also takes us back to one of the reasons
for selecting a rule or a regime of rules rather than considering all the factors
involved at the time of decision: in many situations we trust the person who will
be making the on the spot decision less than we trust the more removed
rule-maker. It may be helpful in resisting assistance in wrongdoing for the lawyer
to be able to say: “The rules of my profession prohibit this; I can’t do it.”112 We
may prefer that lawyers be bound in advance rather than subject to all the pressures of
the moment. Similarly, when it is the client who is vulnerable, we may prefer that
lawyers be bound in advance not to reveal their clients’ confidences to serve their own
Behavioral Research (1975–78), they note that consensus on the correct ethical conduct was frequently
possible, although agreement as to underlying more abstract philosophy was not—that is, the right answer often
seemed clear even without agreement as to the reasons that led to that conclusion.
111. Cf. Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 19–24, 35–37) (on file with author); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational
Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941 (2007); Dana A. Remus, supra note 101, at 1281–82.
112. As noted at the conclusion of Part I.B., supra, some lawyers perceive this as the primary purpose of the
rules of legal ethics—providing the lawyer with a justification for refusing to assist in wrongful conduct.
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or the community’s interests; we may prefer that lawyers be bound to avoid conflicts of
interest, even those unlikely to actually harm the client.
6) The final problem is applicable both to a character/discretion based ethic
and a rule based ethic. The psychology research on ethical perception, conduct,
and decision-making suggests that they are usually not based on rules or
principles, but also are not based on character and deliberation.113 Ethical
conduct and decisions appear to be heavily influenced by context and surround-
ings, and by immediate, unreflective perception and intuition rather than by rules,
principles, character or thinking the matter through in anything resembling a
deliberative process.114 For example, in one experiment subjects were put in a
situation where they were walking across a campus with a task to accomplish.
When they were late and in a hurry, they were very unlikely to stop to assist
someone lying in a doorway moaning and in visible distress. They were unlikely
to even notice them. When the context was not hurried or stressful, they were far
more likely to stop and help. If one person is filling out forms in a room and what
appears to be smoke starts coming in through a vent, more than seventy per cent
of subjects will find the person in authority to point out the problem. If two other
subjects are in the room and do nothing—give no appearance of being concerned
about the smoke coming in—the number of subjects who attempt to do
something drops to ten percent. These experiments suggest that character, rules
or deliberation have far less influence on conduct than context.115 To the extent
this is an accurate description, it presents a bleak picture for those of us interested
in “ethics” in the traditional understanding: rational deliberation about moral
questions. It is also somewhat bleak for those attempting to teach professional
ethics in the required course in the law schools, and for those attempting to set up
corporate ethics and compliance programs or similar programs for law firms and
lawyers. At the least it presents a significant challenge.
E. BOTH SIDES NOW? FOUR NON-EXCLUSIVE POSSIBILITIES FOR
RESPONDING TO THE RULES VERSUS CHARACTER DICHOTOMY
There are thus significant strengths and weaknesses for a regime of lawyers’
ethics based on rules and, alternatively, for one based on discretion, character and
113. See, e.g., Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser, The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition
in Moral Judgment, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082 (2006); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001).
114. See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 111; Regan, Jr., supra note 111; Bradley Wendel, Ethical Lawyering in a
Morally Dangerous World, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 299, 299–307 (2006) and sources cited therein; Haidt,
supra note 113.
115. See JOHN MICHAEL DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL BEHAVIOR 32–35 (citing BIBB
LATAN´E & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN’T HE HELP (1970) (artificial smoke
experiment) and John M. Darley & Daniel C. Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A Study of Situational and
Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 100 (1973) (hurried passerby
study)).
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practical wisdom. A rule flags the moral choice presented and directs a clear
decision. But, not infrequently, the indicated choice will be wrong—wrong both
from the perspective of ordinary “all things considered” morality, and often from
the perspective of the background values and intentions underlying the rule.
Professor Schauer presents a helpful summary for which might be the best choice
for directing lawyers’ ethics.
Where decision-makers are likely to be trusted, and where the array of
decisions they are expected to make will contain a high proportion of
comparatively unique decision-prompting events with serious consequences if
they are decided erroneously [both often the case for lawyers’ ethical
decisions], we might expect the rule-based mode to be rejected, or at least its
stringency tempered. But where there is reason to distrust a set of decision-
makers with certain kinds of determinations [unfortunately, also true for
lawyers], and where the array of decisions to be made seems comparatively
predictable, errors of rule-based under- or over-inclusion are likely to be less
prevalent than decision-maker errors, and consequently the arguments for rules
will be stronger.116
Because aspects of the situation of lawyers are found on both sides, we are left
with no clear indication for lawyers’ethics. We will briefly explore four possibilities.
1. MAINTAIN PROFESSIONAL RULES
In light of the advantages of rules and the difficulties of discretion, the
profession could maintain the status quo of a rule-oriented regime. At least in
regard to individual clients the professional model has descriptive accuracy and
thus persuasive power—there appears to be a real need for client-protective rules.
Clients (and patients) are vulnerable and dependent upon professionals in regard
to very important parts of their lives. The professionals are making a living from
that dependence and therefore are tempted to exploit that vulnerability. Strong
client (and patient) protective rules therefore seem justified. With powerful
clients this conclusion does not fit as well. The professional model and traditional
understanding do not comport with the quite different nature of the risk,117 and
perhaps as a result, sufficient rules have not yet been developed to deal with the
risk of the powerful corporate client. Or perhaps elite lawyers, who have tended
to dominate in the drafting of the rules, perceive the risks of the other hemisphere
of the profession more clearly than they see the risks in their own.118 Even in light
116. SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 152. In this section of the book Professor Schauer is exploring the ways
rules allocate power. Rules “allocate power to the past and away from the present,” SCHAUER, supra note 86, at
160, but they also “allocate power horizontally, determining who, at a given slice of time, is to determine what.”
SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 161.
117. See supra Parts I.B., C., and E.2.
118. See, e.g., Philip Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral
Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244, 245–46 (1968). As Shuchman quite persuasively articulates, we can also see
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of the many disadvantages of rules, perhaps they remain the appropriate choice
for at least some aspects of the situation of many lawyers.
2. IMPROVE THE RULES WITH PARTICULARITY
An effort could be made to foresee with greater clarity the kinds of situations in
which current rules might fail or be inapplicable, and draft further rules or
refinements to cover these situations—an effort by expansion of the specifics of
the rules to lessen occasions of error. The 2002 amendments to the Model Rules
are an example of such an effort: the ABA added specific exceptions to the
obligation of confidentiality where the conclusion had been reached that
confidentiality was over-inclusive (that is, was protecting that which should not
be protected), and also added greater detail to the provisions on conflicts of
interest.119 In this effort, we try to find the ways in which a particular rule could
fail and draft caveats, exceptions, or sub-rules to deal with the anticipated failure.
Some improvement may result. Ultimately, however, this direction leads to
futility.120 The various case and problem books developed for the required legal
profession and ethics course in law school present situation after situation which
straddle the rule lines, fall in gaps, or otherwise exemplify the failure of rules to
provide a precise answer. One simply cannot anticipate all the situations that may
arise. And, to the extent the effort is made, the resulting ramification and
complication of the rules are likely to make them far less accessible. Moreover,
rules for lawyers are already far more extensive than those for other professions.
3. HAVING IT BOTH WAYS—MAKE THE RULES THEMSELVES TO SOME EXTENT
DISCRETIONARY
As we do now, we could have a set of client protective rules, derived from the
risk to vulnerable clients. We could also develop a set of rules designed to restrain
lawyer facilitation of corporate (or other powerful client) wrongdoing. We would
then be doing the best we could with rules to deal with both sides of the
dichotomies explored in Parts I and II, above. The serious limitations associated
with the application of rules could be significantly ameliorated, however, by
this less flatteringly as simple interest group drafting of biased rules: The BLFs (“big law firm lawyers” in
Shuchman’s usage) stigmatizing the LLs (the “little lawyers”). Id. at 250–51; see also HEINZ ET AL., supra note
10, at 95–97.
119. MODEL RULES R. 1.6, 1.9–1.11.
120. See Loder, supra note 90, at 311–12. One is reminded of Grant Gilmore’s oft-quoted conclusion: “In
Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.” GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES
OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977). Or, as I sometimes suggest to my students, any attempt to frame a rule or
principle eventually will run into the “aggregate perversity of human behavior”: given enough time and a
substantial enough number of applications of the rule, a situation will arise to make it look foolish in its
application and consequences, at least in that instance. The occasional instance of a rule leading to a
frustratingly wrong result is often overbalanced, however, by the far larger number of situations in which the
rule leads to a relatively correct result under the policies and intentions leading to its creation. Some unfortunate
results under a rule do not mean the rule lacks general utility.
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considering them to be strong, but rebuttable, presumptions. The lawyer would
be obligated to follow a particular rule unless there were strong, persuasive
reasons not to. Those reasons are likely to be of very different kinds: (a) The
underlying justification for the rules might not correspond well with the actual
facts in the particular situation. (For example, a large corporation may well not be
vulnerable in relation to the particular lawyer, the client may well have the
greater knowledge and power, and it may be the client who is attempting to
exploit the lawyer.121) (b) Client conduct to be facilitated by the lawyer following
the rules would involve substantial injury to innocent third parties that could not
be morally justified aside from the existence of the rule. (c) Whatever—an
infinitude of varying situations of human interaction can arise that are likely, at
some point in time, to make a rule directed answer just plain wrong under the
circumstances. The strength of the character/discretion model is that it leaves
room for everything that might be significant or relevant, and the attraction of a
rebuttable presumption understanding of the obligation of ethical rules is that it
makes significant room for the application of character and the judgment of
practical wisdom, while maintaining much of the practical, day-to-day value of
rules.122 Ordinarily the rules would still be determinative, but character would be
given room to be effective.
121. See supra Part I.B.; I. E. 2.
122.
In most cases, the result generated by the most locally applicable and pedigreed rule controls. But in
every case that rule will be tested against a larger and unpedigreeable set of considerations, and the
rule will be set aside when the result it indicates is egregiously at odds with the result that is indicated
by this larger and more morally acceptable set of values.
SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 205 (describing and justifying what he terms “presumptive positivism”). Earlier in
the book, he identifies something similar as “rule-sensitive particularism”:
This form of decision-making treats rules as rules of thumb in the sense of being transparent to their
substantive justification, but allows their very existence and effect as rules of thumb to become a
factor in determining whether rules should be set aside when the results they indicate diverge from the
results indicated by direct application of their substantive justifications.
SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 97 (citation omitted). See also the development of a theory of “recourse roles,” in
Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: A Study of Lawful Departures from Legal
Rules, (1973) (suggesting a theory of “recourse roles” that permit actors with role-authorized discretion to
violate otherwise applicable rules); W. Bradley Wendel, Three Concepts of Roles, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 547,
553 (2011) (noting that “[t]he idea of recourse roles is intended to steer a middle course . . . [T]he actor is
justified in departing from the specific requirements of the role [only] in order to further the substantive
underlying policies embodied in the role”). Alexander and Sherwin adopt Schauer’s usage, but do not believe
the approach can work. “It is our position that this gap between the morality of issuing rules and the morality of
following rules cannot be closed . . . . Rules cannot usefully be given a presumptive value or ‘weight.’”
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 86, at 54. The example they provide is of a prohibition on swimming in a
particular area due to danger from frequent strong tides. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 86, at 55. While the
rule in general makes sense and is a good one, “[f]or those who understand the tides or swim powerfully, and
who have a reason to swim, compliance may not be the right thing to do.” ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note
86, at 55–56. Some significant portion of lawyers may be analogous to the swimmers in their knowledge of the
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The choice not to be bound by the rules would need to be supported by
deliberation—reasoned analysis, preferably developed at least partly through
conversation with professional peers or friends (that is by some sort of
community). Those lawyers disinclined to take the time or effort for this
deliberation would not need to do so; they would have the rules to rely on. Under
the rebuttable presumption approach, only the lawyer able to think through and
articulate a problem carefully, and then persuasively frame reasons why a rule
should not apply, would have a ground for rebutting the presumption.123 As noted
above, lawyers are not particularly trained or skilled in applied moral philosophy
and are also often not surrounded by the kind of community that sustains
character. Lawyers perceiving themselves in such a situation, or simply
disinclined to go through the process and effort, would have the rules. On the
other hand, also as noted above, lawyers tend to understand the weaknesses of
rules, and to appreciate how often they reach the wrong result. This approach
would allow lawyers with this appreciation, and a willingness to think through
the particular situation, to sometimes come up with a better, more justifiable
solution to the particular ethical problem at issue.124
tides (facts and applicable legal rules), but they may well also have a sufficient appreciation of the weight and
presumption of the rule at issue—and of the value and usefulness of rules in general—to desist from swimming
(that is, from finding the particular ethical rule defeasible under the circumstances) unless there is an unusually
strong moral reason for doing so. Lawyers as a category may have more training, judgment and wisdom under
the circumstances than the knowledgeable swimmer hypothesized by Alexander and Sherwin. Or they may not:
that is an empirical question on which readers of this article are likely to differ. Alexander and Sherwin noted
that “some people will believe they understand the tides or swim powerfully when in fact they do not.”
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 86, at 56. Even if this is so, and they mistakenly swim to their great risk and
occasional fatality, the rule will still have been effective for the far larger portion of the population who will
have been effectively restrained from the excessive danger. And the same may well be true of lawyers in
analogous situations.
123. This suggestion is analogous to Karl Llewellyn’s assertions in The Bramble Bush concerning the ability
of the able judge to distinguish away precedents while the less able judge will remain bound. KARL LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 68 (1960). Professor Simon has framed an understanding of
legal ethics based on context and broad principals rather than rules, and argued that lawyers’ training in
sophisticated analysis of law and policy prepares them sufficiently for the elaborate analyses and subtle
distinctions he suggests. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 56, at 1090–1113. The alternative sketched here
is similar to Simon’s in that both reject rules and categorical thinking (at least to some significant extent in this
proposal). The proposals differ in that Simon would substitute legal principles, whereas this proposal substitutes
moral reflection and judgment. Pepper, Integrating Morality, supra note 56, at 1013–1020. Simon’s approach
has been criticized on the basis that his purportedly legal principles seem so broad and indeterminate that they
appear to amount to his own moral analysis and practical judgment. Id. at 1021–25; David Luban, Reason and
Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 892–93 (1999); see also Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical
Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21, 24 (2003) (supporting the
propositions that “the lawyer’s professional responsibility carries with it a duty . . . to exercise . . . discretion,”
and “requiring that that such decisionmaking be carried out through a justifiable process of ethical
deliberation”).
124. Schauer notes that “it is often the case that specialized training or education makes some people better
able than the rest of us to evaluate certain factors.” SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 150. He also notes that
“[r]ule-based decision-making is thus an application of the theory of the second-best.” SCHAUER, supra note 86,
at 152. In theory, sometimes discretion and full-context based decision-making might be ideal. Whether lawyers
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How such an approach might be incorporated into a regulatory regime raises
large and difficult questions. If the rules were not followed and discipline
initiated, the issue would be whether or not the presumption that the rules govern
had been sufficiently rebutted under the circumstances. The exercise of discretion—
based on a rebuttal of the presumption that the applicable rule was binding—
would need to be defended on the basis of a thought-through choice supported by
reasoned justification. The adequacy and persuasiveness of that justification
could then be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis, with a common law
developing to provide guidance. The focus could be as much, or possibly more,
on the consultation, deliberation and reasons (the process) as on whether or not
the lawyer had reached the substantively correct answer.125
4. CLIENT CONSULTATION, CONVERSATION AND MORAL DIALOGUE—A WAY FOR
CHARACTER AND VIRTUE TO FUNCTION IN COMBINATION WITH BINDING RULES
Assuming a regime consisting primarily of rules (either option 1 or 2
immediately above, roughly the status quo in regard to lawyer regulation),
character, virtue and judgment could be applied through lawyer-client conversa-
tions concerning moral aspects of the situation at issue. In this way the exercise of
practical wisdom could be at least partly incorporated into the lawyer-client
relationship, as it often is by many lawyers now. The problem of assisting morally
wrongful (but lawful) client conduct can be ameliorated by conversations
concerning the moral aspects of the matter. The lawyer can clarify that: (a) the
client has a choice in the matter; (b) client’s planned conduct is morally
problematic, at least in the lawyer’s understanding; and (c) the fact that the
conduct is lawful does not remove the moral problem. The lawyer would be
attempting to make explicit the client’s moral responsibility for the conduct and
draw out the client’s values. In such a scenario the lawyer has honored the
primary obligation of providing access to the law but has also leavened that
access with moral considerations.126 Such an approach could (and probably
should) be used in combination with that in subpart (3) above: the lawyer would
consult and counsel with the client in the course of determining whether the
situation is one in which defeasance of the rule at issue is appropriate.
merit the trust to choose when a rule should or should not be applied—whether to entrust lawyers with such
discretion—remains unclear. SCHAUER, supra note 86, at 97–98, n.26; see also infra the examples at Part
IV.C. 4.
125. Professor Simon suggests a similar development for the disciplinary process for his principle/discretion-
based proposals for a regime of lawyers’ ethics. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 56, at 1096–1102.
126. I have developed this suggestion before, as have others. See Pepper, Ethics in the Gap, supra note 20, at
190–92; Pepper, Integrating Morality, supra note 56, at 1016–20; Feldman, supra note 91, at 886–87. See
generally Jamie Heller, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How to Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE
L.J. 2503 (1994); Kruse, Cardboard Client, supra note 20; and other sources cited supra note 36.
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Full counseling of this kind might be required by a rule-based obligation.
When the lawyer perceives the gap between law and justice to be significant,
perhaps it ought to be part of the requisite ethical responsibility to clarify to the
client that he or she has a moral choice in the matter.127 That clarification ought to
include not only the fact that the client has a choice in the matter, but that if
injustice occurs it will be the client’s primary responsibility, not the law’s and not
the lawyer’s.
This approach addresses most directly the second risk elaborated above and
briefly discussed in addressing “the corporation as client and as risk”: the
powerful client using the lawyer’s assistance in morally wrongful conduct.128 It is
also appropriate when an individual client, powerful or not, wants to use the
lawyer’s assistance for arguably wrongful conduct. In addition, however, it is a
real possibility for ameliorating the other primary risk: lawyer exploitation of the
vulnerable client. The presence or probability of this kind of conflict of interest is
the paradigmatic situation where a client-protective rule rather than discretion
might appear to be appropriate129 because the lawyer’s judgment may well be
affected. In the situation presented in Part I. A. above, lawyer Novak is tempted to
recommend acceptance of an early $15,000 settlement offer rather than wait for
the probable $60,000 he believes a jury will likely award later (or a later offer
closer to that $60,000), because he would get a quick payment immediately with
almost no work, whereas the later, larger payment would require a great deal of
his time. The right answer here is clearly counseling and consultation: the client
should be fully and honestly informed of the options and probabilities by the
lawyer. The difficulty for the lawyer is to be straightforward and fully honest in
such a conversation, not to exaggerate or dwell on the risks of recovering
nothing, for example. It is not easy to facilitate the client’s choice without
manipulating or directing it toward the result that favors the lawyer’s interests—it
requires on the part of the lawyer both counseling skills and the requisite
character to want to practice law as required by the “professional” ethic—that is,
putting the client’s interests first.130 It should be noted that it is also difficult to
facilitate the client’s choice without manipulating it toward the conclusion the
lawyer perceives as morally preferable.
127. See supra note 105. The rules currently in effect already require some of this communication and permit
the rest of it. Rule 1.2 requires the lawyer to “consult with the client as to . . . means.” MODEL RULES R. 1.2. Rule
1.4 repeats that requirement and adds the obligation to “explain a matter” sufficiently to allow the client to
“make informed decisions.” MODEL RULES R. 1.4. Rule 2.1 requires “candid advice” from the lawyer and
permits reference to “moral, economic social and political factors” in providing it. MODEL RULES R. 2.1.
128. See supra Part I.C.
129. For example, under the rubric suggested by Professor Schauer and quoted in the text accompanying
supra note 116.
130. Daisy Hurst Floyd, supra note 97, at 209–213.
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IV. APPLICATIONS
Up to this point our consideration of the three dichotomies has consisted
primarily of explication with relatively little application. To illustrate how the
distinctions make a difference, three situations are presented below, with each of
the three dichotomies briefly considered in relation to each of the situations. The
possibility of using legally available mechanisms to intentionally delay resolu-
tion of a litigated matter is considered first. We then take a look at the well-known
problem of a cross examination designed to cast doubt on the veracity or
reliability of a witness known to be testifying truthfully. Finally, we consider the
problem of accurate legal advice in a regulatory setting that may encourage the
client to violate the law. In each situation, where one falls on the dichotomies may
make a significant difference in the ethical analysis and the result reached.
A. DELAYING TACTICS IN LITIGATION
1. UNDER THE FIRST DICHOTOMY (PRIMARY RISK: CLIENT OR LAWYER?)
Consider two possible situations in which delay might be useful in litigation
from the perspective of the first dichotomy: where is the primary risk; who needs
protection?
[First,] a man whose lifelong dream has been to open a restaurant persuades a
wealthy cousin to lend him $50,000. The man is unsophisticated in business
matters while the cousin is not. The man signs a demand note for the loan and
opens the restaurant. Food critics give it excellent reviews; great success is
predicted. Seeing this, the cousin calls the note, then brings an action on it,
intending to acquire the restaurant in a foreclosure sale. The man goes to a
lawyer who sees improbable defenses on the merits and who proceeds to make
a series of nonfrivolous procedural motions calculated to gain time for her
client until either the restaurant’s cash flow is great enough to pay the note or a
bank loan can be obtained. The motions are either weak, with the lawyer
expecting them to fail, or they are highly technical. [For example, one motion
points out that the law requires process servers to be eighteen, but the process
server in this case was one month under that age.]
[Second,] while on her way home from a job as a housekeeper, a single mother
of three children is hurt by falling debris at a construction site. She suffers
permanent injuries that prevent her from resuming gainful employment. She
sues the construction company. Its lawyer, recognizing only weak defenses on
the merits, makes [the same procedural motions with] the effect of increasing
pressure on the financially desperate plaintiff to settle for a tenth of what she
could reasonably expect to recover at trial.131
131. Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1011, 1011–1022 (1986), as
quoted in LISA LERMAN & PHILIP SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 646–647 (3rd ed., 2012).
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A paradigm which conceives of lawyers’ ethics as protecting a vulnerable
client will not distinguish between these two situations. The job of the lawyer will
be to serve the client’s interests, and in each instance using the available
technicalities for delay will substantially benefit the client. A paradigm concerned
with clients using lawyers to effectuate wrongful conduct would, to the contrary,
clearly distinguish the two situations. In the first the client is not powerful and,
more significantly, is not engaged in wrongdoing. He appears to be threatened by
wrongdoing. In the second situation a powerful corporation would be using the
technicalities to reach a result both morally wrongful and unjust under the governing
tort law132—exactly the primary concern of the second ethical understanding.
2. UNDER THE THIRD DICHOTOMY (RULES OR LAWYER DISCRETION AND
PRACTICAL WISDOM?)
A professional ethic based upon character and discretion also easily distin-
guishes between the first and second scenarios. All things considered, exercising
the technicalities to achieve delay and save the restaurant for the client who
conceived and created it clearly appears to be the right thing to do. Similarly, all
things considered, using those same technicalities to prevent the injured mother
from receiving compensation due her under the substantive law clearly appears to
be the wrong thing to do.133 Persons of good character would recognize this, and
an ethical regime of discretion would allow them to choose to do the right
thing—not assert the delaying technicalities.
Moving to the “rule” side of that dichotomy, given the currently dominant
paradigm of providing the client with access to and assistance in using the law,
one would expect a rule requiring that the lawyer assert the technicality on behalf
of the client if that were the client’s preference: the lawyer would be allowed to
prevent injustice in the first scenario and required to effectuate it in the second.
Surprisingly that is not the current rule. The lawyer is required to “abide by a
client’s decisions concerning . . . objectives,” but is only required to “con-
sult . . . as to the means.”134 In the second situation, the corporate client’s
132. Morally wrongful has tended to be my focus of analysis, unjust under the substantive law has tended to
be Professsor Simon’s. See Pepper, Integrating Morality, supra note 56, at 1014; Simon, Role Differentiation,
supra note 56, at 995.
133. See Pepper, Integrating Morality, supra note 56, at 1027:
What the cousin is attempting to do in the first situation seems morally wrong (although it also
appears lawful). He is attempting to acquire something which, from a moral perspective, is not
rightfully his. It rightfully is the client’s—the fruits primarily of his imagination and labor, and only
very secondarily of the cousin’s financing. In the second situation, the near consensus moral
perspective would see the defendant corporation as “taking advantage” of the client’s weakness and
poverty to seize a benefit it does not deserve.
134. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a). The rule is applicable to all questions of means, not just ethically questionable
ones. It is probably framed to give lawyers discretion in accomplishing the specifics of the work, where the
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objective is clearly to pay the least possible money regardless of the conse-
quences to the woman and her children, and apparently the lawyer is required to
“abide” by that. But the delaying technicalities are clearly means, and as to these
the lawyer is only required to “consult.” The Comment to Rule 1.2 provides some
further guidance:
Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with
respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with
respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually
defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and
concern for third persons who might be adversely affected.135
Should the lawyer choose to refuse to follow the client’s preference to
implement the delaying legal provisions (that is, not defer to the client in a
situation where the Comment states lawyers “usually” do), the rule gives no
further guidance. The lawyer is required in general to “render candid advice,” and
is permitted to discuss “moral . . . factors . . . that may be relevant to the client’s
situation.”136 Assuming the lawyer and client remain in disagreement, the lawyer
can continue to refuse, and the client is left with deciding whether or not this
particular means is important enough to justify the costs of firing the lawyer and
finding another.137 If this is a firm of multiple lawyers, as is probable, there are
two possibilities. It may be that refusing to effectuate the client’s choice to do the
morally wrong thing is a firm-wide decision, and the client has to decide whether
to replace the firm. More likely in today’s corporate legal environment, the
decision may be that of one firm lawyer, and it is probable that another lawyer in
the firm is readily available to step in and effectuate the client’s preference for
delay.
One could relatively easily frame a rule requiring the lawyer to effectuate a
client’s request for assistance within the bounds of the law—a rule that would
require the lawyer to facilitate delay in both scenarios. And the prior rule appears
to have come close to this.138 It is more difficult to imagine a rule that effectively
lawyer is most skilled and knowledgeable, and the client likely not. See infra note 135 and accompanying text
quoting Comment 2 to the rule.
135. MODEL RULES R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (emphasis added). Comments to the Model Rules are advisory, not binding.
MODEL RULES pmbl. 14, 21. Prior to the 2002 amendments, the distinction in the comment was directive and
normative rather than descriptive in both clauses: clients and lawyers “should defer” rather than “usually defer.”
136. MODEL RULES R. 2.1.
137. Pepper, Integrating Morality, supra note 56, at 1015–20.
138. Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility read in part: “A lawyer shall not
intentionally: (1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted
by law . . .” MODEL CODE DR 7-101(A) (1980). This was then discounted by 7-101 (B): “In his representation of
a client, a lawyer may: (1) Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a
right or position of his client.” MODEL CODE DR 7-101(B). No indication is given as to what is meant by “where
permissible,” but it would appear to be a reference to law external to the Code, and thus to have left the rules,
again, without a clear answer to a quite basic question.
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distinguishes between the first and second scenarios, but an attempt could be
made to frame such a provision. Character, virtue and discretion, however, easily
make such a distinction.
Before moving on, it should be noted that any consideration of the third
dichotomy as it applies to any particular situation leads toward a consideration of
what specific rules or principles might be framed to guide or determine the
lawyer’s conduct. The evaluation of our rules and consideration of alternatives in
this fashion is, of course, a staple topic of scholarship concerned with lawyers’
ethics and professional responsibilities. Consideration of the possible specific
rules which might be framed to govern the conduct at issue in these applications
would, however, entail an undertaking appropriate to several full articles, and is
thus well beyond the scope of the exploration undertaken here.
3. UNDER THE SECOND DICHOTOMY (PRIMARY ALLEGIANCE TO THE CLIENT OR TO SOME
LARGER COMMUNITY?)
If the lawyer’s primary allegiance is to the individual client’s autonomy, under
the restaurant financing scenario it would appear to be ethically appropriate to use
the legally available delaying tactics to protect the client’s ownership of the
restaurant. If the larger community interest is primary, and can trump individual
interest, the analysis is more difficult. Ordinary morality is served by using the
technicalities to create delay. But the law of contract and the legal procedure for
enforcing it would be frustrated. In addition, on the community interest side of
the balance, delay in litigation is generally perceived as a significant communal
problem. Delay manufactured by one party to serve its own interest is seen as a
serious sub-part of that problem and often considered wrongful conduct.139 It is
far from clear which side of these more general communal interests would be
considered the stronger. Do we judge on the balance of benefit and detriment in
this particular instance, or in some kind of aggregate, rule-utilitarian calculation?
Does the reader have a clear preference as to which interest is stronger? As to
which metric should be used?
A second problem with determining the larger community interest in the
restaurant situation is the question of pretextual use of the law. The purposes of
the available technicalities are not articulated in the example, but the provisions
139. Intentional delay is usually considered the problem, yet the Model Rules do not try to prohibit or limit it.
Rather, they require that the lawyer go further and “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent
with the interests of the client.” MODEL RULES R. 3.2. Of course the final clause comes close to rendering the rule
nugatory: lawyers are obligated to serve the interests of their clients, and if those are served by delay, the rule
appears to be cancelled. The Comment then attempts to cancel out that clear effect of the proviso: “Realizing
financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.”
Considering that “financial gain” is what most lawyers are working toward for most clients, and that lawyers are
working in a predominantly capitalist economy, this is quite a curious statement. Comments are not binding,
however, and do not change the meaning of the black letter rules.
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were not created in order to allow discretionary delay in litigation. Is it ethically
acceptable for a lawyer to use these provisions for delay, a purpose clearly
different from those for which they were created? If we need a hammer, but only
have a large wrench at hand, we are likely to use the wrench as a hammer. Is it
acceptable for the restaurant owner’s lawyer to use these technicalities to delay
litigation enforcing a valid contractual debt, even though such a use was not
intended? If we switch for a moment to the other scenario, is it acceptable for the
construction corporation’s litigation counsel to use these technicalities to force
the plaintiff into a settlement far below the value indicated by the substantive
law? This is a large and problematic topic, bringing up several difficult questions.
The law is there; it is publicly available. Should lawyers be responsible for
limiting its use to the purposes for which it was created? Or, should that be the
client’s choice? Would limiting the “off label” uses of law constrain its creative
and positive development? Should it be up to the lawyer to decide what is a
creative and positive pretextual use and what is wrongful or abusive one?140 Or,
once again, should there be some rule-utilitarian guidance or limitation on the
lawyer’s conduct?
Moving to the construction accident scenario, we have the added difficulty
under the third dichotomy of understanding how to envision the corporate entity
client. Should we conceive of the corporation as an individual? If so, then the
analysis above for the restaurateur would remain the same for the construction
company: if the client’s autonomy is the guide, the delaying technicalities should
be deployed as the client has directed. Similarly, if we assume some larger
communal interest is the lawyer’s primary ethical allegiance, the same analyses
and difficulties arise as above. But if we conceive of the corporation as itself a
community or a communal interest, the alternatives become more puzzling. Do
the corporation’s interests gain in weight or legitimacy because it is a communal
entity and not an individual? Are its choices due more deference from the lawyer
than an individual’s would be under otherwise similar situations? Earlier, in the
elaboration of the dichotomies, we considered the possibility that the opposite is
actually the case: because corporate entities do not have the full range of
individual human sensibilities and emotions, and because their managers have a
role specific morality focused on shareholder value and profit, the lawyer
arguably should be more constrained in providing access to the law to effectuate
140. Professor Wendel has articulated a traditionally client centered ethic premised on access to the law.
WENDEL, FIDELITY, supra note 15, at 50–52. But he would prohibit what I have called here pretextual uses of law
for the client’s benefit. Cf. id. Professor Simon’s ethic appears to have a similar focus on discerning the genuine
purposes of legal provisions and limiting the lawyer to effectuating those, but has a far less client centered
orientation. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 56, at 1090–1119. I have suggested that “off-label” use of the
law should normally be the client’s choice, with the help of the lawyer’s counsel and deliberation. Pepper,
Integrating Morality, supra note 56, at 1013–20. See also Kenny Heglund, Quibbles, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1491,
1498–1500 (1988–89).
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morally wrongful results.141
B. CROSS EXAMINING THE TRUTHFUL WITNESS
Another example of pretextual use of the law is the cross-examination of a
witness known by the lawyer to be telling the truth with the purpose of suggesting
to the trier of fact that the witness is in fact mistaken, lying or unreliable. The
issue on which the witness is testifying might be determinative, and the matter is
of substantial importance to both parties. The right of cross-examination is
created as a tool to facilitate discerning and determining the truth (the actual facts
underlying the litigation) so that the substantive law can be correctly applied to
those facts. The lawyer in this well-known situation is using the mechanism for
exactly the opposite purpose.
1. UNDER THE FIRST DICHOTOMY
Civil litigation is a contest for the power of the state: the party who loses will
face the power of the state assisting their adversary.142 It is the client who appears
vulnerable from this perspective; if the lawyer shirks, is disloyal or incompetent,
the client will be at a large disadvantage. If the concern underlying lawyers’
ethics is protection of the client, then it would appear that the lawyer should
undertake the cross-examination.143 If, however, the animating concern of
lawyers’ ethics is for third parties who might be victimized by a powerful
lawyer-client combination, then it would seem ethically inappropriate to conduct
such a cross-examination. The lawyer, in a public formal venue, is suggesting
that the truthful witness is lying or otherwise unreliable—an apparent wrong to
the witness and to the opposite party in the litigation.144
2. UNDER THE SECOND DICHOTOMY
The second dichotomy cuts the pie in this situation just as does the first and
presents a very clear picture of the difference in orientation. If primary allegiance
were owed to the individual client, then the lawyer clearly would be obligated to
undertake the cross-examination helpful to that client despite the disservice to the
truth and regardless of the injury to the witness and the opposite party. On
141. Supra Part I.C.
142. Pepper, supra note 58, at 623.
143. Query whether this is true if the client is a large corporation: vulnerable to either the state or the lawyer?
144. How important or determinative are the two factors on this side of the dichotomy: that the conduct is
wrongful and that the client is powerful. If the cross-examination is conducted on behalf of an individual and the
victimized opposite party is a large powerful corporation, is it the corporation that should be protected by
lawyers’ professional ethics? Our concern about wrongdoing by the powerful lawyer-client combination makes
more sense if the situation is the opposite: the lawyer conducting the wrongful cross-examination represents a
powerful corporation against a single individual.
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the other hand, if primary allegiance goes to a larger community interest, then the
cross-examination appears manifestly inappropriate. It disserves both the truth
and resolving the dispute according to the substantive law. Only if we determine
that allegiance to the individual client when considered in the aggregate itself
constitutes a determinative community interest can we reconcile the dichotomy,
essentially by defining it away. The aggregate communal interest in lawyers
providing individually oriented access to the law—including pretextual usages—
would be considered a communal interest of greater importance than either
substantively just dispute resolution or avoiding false public accusations against
witnesses.
3. UNDER THE THIRD DICHOTOMY
Once again, resolving the situation through exercise of the lawyer’s character
and judgment in light of all the circumstances and context is attractive. Unlike
with our first example, however, the morally correct answer in this situation
remains obscure. It depends on knowing more, on a thicker description of the
situation. Moreover, in this situation it seems likely that different lawyers are
likely to reach different resolutions. Some lawyers will value the truth more
highly than others; some will value a substantively correct outcome more highly
than others. Some are likely to value client vulnerability and consequent lawyer
allegiance more highly than others. As a result, the access to the law that clients
receive will diverge significantly depending on the values and moral proclivities
of the particular lawyer they happen to find—a substantial downside of the
character-discretion based ethic. Aside from this concern about uniformity of
the law to which access is gained, individual lawyer character and discretion as
the basis for deciding whether or not to undertake such a cross-examination also
raises the question of the extent to which we want to trust the moral judgment and
practical wisdom of individual lawyers. That concern is particularly present when
the lawyer’s own self-interest is likely to be involved in the decision.
Given the weaknesses, inequality, and indeterminate nature of recourse to
character and discretion, the decision might be that the other side of the
dichotomy—a rule—is preferable. But that leaves the difficult question of what
that rule ought to be. Once again we might assume that if the cross-examination is
lawful, the client can choose to make use of it. But Rule 1.2, as we have seen
above, is to the contrary. The lawyer is required to discuss the question of means
with the client (and the cross-examination of the truthful witness to suggest
falsehood is clearly a means to an end), but is not obligated to defer to the client’s
choice.145 In some ways, it appears that the rule defaults to an individual,
discretionary choice by the lawyer: the rule in these cases could be seen as
recourse to the individual lawyer’s judgment and discretion. But this surprising
145. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
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rule is not the only possibility. We could easily frame a rule that requires the
lawyer to give access to legally available means if the client so chooses. And that
is likely what many, perhaps most, lawyers believe their obligation is. Such a rule
would seem to reflect the modern American lawyer ethos more than does the
current non-rule. Or, we could frame a rule that is more truth protective, requiring
that lawyers in litigation not take action that intentionally deceives or misleads
the trier of fact.146
C. ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION ON WATER POLLUTION LIMITS
In this application, assume that the client operates an industrial facility in a
rural area that discharges ammonia. The Environmental Protection Agency has
promulgated:
[A] water pollution regulation, widely publicized to relevant industries,
prohibiting discharge of ammonia at amounts greater than .050 grams per liter
of effluent. The client owns a rural plant that discharges ammonia in its effluent,
the removal of which would be very expensive. The lawyer knows from
informal sources that: (1) violations of .075 grams per liter or less are ignored
because of a limited enforcement budget; and (2) EPA inspection in rural areas
is rare, and in such areas enforcement officials usually issue a warning prior to
applying sanctions unless the violation is extreme (more than 1.5 grams per
liter).147
Should the lawyer inform the client of all this information, knowing that this
knowledge may well lead the client to a violation of the formal .050 effluent limit,
and thus to greater water pollution? Or should the lawyer inform the client only of
the .050 formal regulation, likely leading to the client’s compliance with that
limit?
1. UNDER THE FIRST DICHOTOMY
If the lawyer chooses to inform the client of the .050 limit only, conveying that
compliance with that limit is what “the law” requires, the client arguably has been
denied full access to and knowledge of the law. The client has not been informed
of the option of violating with either highly improbable sanctions or the limited
146. When I teach the required Legal Profession course I frame a discussion by asking the students whether
they would vote to adopt the following rule: “A lawyer shall not elicit testimony that leads to a conclusion the
lawyer knows to be false.” This would appear to prohibit a cross examination designed to cast doubt on the
testimony of a witness known to have testified truthfully, among a number of other practices it would prohibit. I
ask them this question after they have read an excerpt from Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for the Truth: an
Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L Rev. 1031 (1975), testing the extent to which they agree with Judge Frankel. (In the
same assignment they have also read quite different views on the lawyer’s obligation to the truth from Philip
Shuchman and Monroe Freedman.)
147. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 33, at 1551.
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sanction of a warning only. In regard to the former it has been denied the option
of discharging between .050 and .075. In regard to the latter, it has been denied
the option of violating between .075 and 1.5 and taking its chances with a
probable warning or other possible enforcement. From this perspective the client
is vulnerable in relation to the lawyer’s superior knowledge; its freedom of
choice has been constrained by the lawyer’s decision as much as by the formal
law. Furthermore, it is possible that the corporation will be placed at a
competitive disadvantage in regard to others in the industry whose lawyers may
well be willing to share the enforcement related information. Corporate managers
not infrequently express a perception of vulnerability in relation to the
government (leaving lawyers aside), often seeing regulators as overzealous or
unreasonable, and regulations as heavy-handed and a drag on productivity,
efficiency and innovation.148 If the correct ethical orientation is to protect
vulnerable clients and give them full access to the law, on first look it would
appear that the lawyer is obligated to provide the client with knowledge of the
enforcement related information that may facilitate or encourage violation of the
written .050 limit.
If, on the other hand, the function of lawyers’ ethics is to protect third parties
and the public from wrongdoing by a combination of powerful client and lawyer,
then it would appear that the lawyer ought to inform the client of the .050 limit
only and withhold the further information that might facilitate violation of the
formal law. Presumably, ammonia effluent is limited because it is harmful, either
to downstream wildlife or people or both. A limited enforcement budget, not a
determination of no significant harm, has led to the de facto (perhaps temporary)
move to .075 enforced from .050 written. If discharge in this range is harmful,
then the alternate side of the dichotomy suggests lawyers should attempt to
protect those who would be harmed. It is possible, however, that inspection is
rare and discharges under 1.5 result only in a warning in rural areas because there
is little chance of harm from such levels of pollution in such relatively
undeveloped and unindustrialized areas. The EPA may be calibrating rural
enforcement as a matter of risk assessment and policy, not just budget
constraint.149 If this is the case, then it is more difficult to cast the lawyer/client
conduct as “wrongful” to third parties and there would seem to be no ethical
constraint on informing the client of the enforcement related facts. Both sides of
the dichotomy on this application are complicated by the question of how to best
understand regulatory limits and penalties. Is the intended message of the law
148. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and
Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REV 1615, 1618 (2006) (“Either because of special interests or
lawmaker incompetence, [corporate managers] think, the law will often be inferior to what the market would do
on its own, or with less heavy-handed regulatory interference.”).
149. These possibilities are laid out in more detail in Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 33, at
1570–71.
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that the foreseeable penalty be understood as a cost that the actor is free to
discount by its probability and balance against the potential benefits of the
unlawful conduct? Or does the formal legal line express a norm and a societal
intention to establish a prohibition in a way that suggests the actor ought not
violate the limit even if it calculates that it is likely to benefit by doing so?150
2. UNDER THE SECOND DICHOTOMY
If the ethical orientation of the lawyer is to the individual client, the water
pollution scenario again brings us to the question of the appropriate understand-
ing of the corporation. Is it an individual, albeit an artificial, legally fabricated
one? Is it to be treated as a collection of individuals, and thus as a surrogate for
their interests? If either of these is the case, then it would seem that an obligation
primarily oriented to this “individual,” group of individuals, or surrogate for
individuals, would require full information as to both the formal law and the
enforcement realities that limit it, allowing the corporation to make its own
choices in regard to its understanding of the nature of legal obligation and its
preferred level of risk of legal consequences. If we choose, on the other hand, to
consider the corporation not to be an individual, or a surrogate for individuals,
then we are moved to the other side of the dichotomy and must consider the
corporation as itself a community, or we must determine what the larger
community interest is in a corporation’s access to and use of the law.
We might understand the corporation as a creation of the community, and in
creating it (or authorizing its creation) the community might have included an
obligation on corporations to defer to the law greater than that of a natural
individual. Under this view, a corporation might be understood as obligated to
defer to the formal law as a condition of its legal creation, whereas an individual
has the option to consider the probability of enforcement and the severity of
consequences. Even if corporate law did not formally delimit corporate
personhood in this manner (as it currently does not), lawyers’ ethics might. An
understanding of lawyers’ ethics as oriented primarily toward a larger community
interest, rather than to individuals, might require lawyers to limit the assistance
given to corporations in just this way. Lawyers could provide access to the formal
law but not to enforcement realities that might undermine that law while being
beneficial to corporate clients. This understanding dovetails to some extent with
the perspective of the first dichotomy. Corporations are frequently large and
powerful in relation to their lawyers, third parties, and the community. Because
they are more of a threat, and are far more limited in their concerns and
sensibilities than natural persons, a special, limited understanding of their right to
150. See Langevoort, supra note 148, at 1619–20 and sources cited therein; Cynthia Williams, Corporate
Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1286–1300 (1998).
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access to and use of the law could be argued as justified.151
Identifying what the community interest is brings us back to the question
raised at the conclusion of the prior section, an issue arguably more apt in regard
to the second dichotomy than the first. What does the community intend to signal:
the formal line or the discounted penalty? Even assuming an ethical orientation
primarily toward a communal interest or obligation, it is difficult to discern in this
instance what that is. Communicating to clients only the formal line may be
masking information the community intended to make available and have
effectuated in the risk assessment influenced choices of those clients. It seems
unlikely that lawmakers and enforcement officials are acting with such precise
intentions and effects in mind, but some economists see in such enforcement
policies and choices the aggregate wisdom and precision of the invisible hand at
work, even though those making and enforcing the law are not usually considered
to be market actors.
3. UNDER THE THIRD DICHOTOMY
On first consideration the water pollution situation seems one in which
discretion and character may well provide the better solution. Is this rural area
one in which discharge of ammonia above the .05 limit is unlikely to entail
serious harm? Or is there a community or communities, or an ecosystem,
downstream subject to significant harm? The effluent limitation is a general rule,
generally applicable (and framed with that in mind), but the lawyer is advising in
regard to a specific application in a specific place. The lawyer should have
specific knowledge of the local risks of pollution in this particular situation or can
gain it from the client.152 Thus the lawyer is in a good position to assess the risk
entailed in encouraging the client to violate the .05 limit by providing
enforcement information. In addition, the lawyer may well have specific
knowledge about the client. Does this client have a low regard for regulatory
officials and enforcement, considering them inept or heavy handed? Does it
consider legal regulation essentially as a cost risk, and nothing more? Or does it
understand legal regulations as norms that ought to provide guidance and
restraint, absent strong countervailing reasons? Does it have a mixed and
reasoned approach to such questions, seeing regulation as both possible cost
and as norm, balancing the two in a nuanced manner? The lawyer’s knowledge of
this might also be quite limited. She might be familiar with the one or two
corporate actors who are her contacts as to this matter, but have little knowledge
of the balance, mix or possible complexities of “the corporation’s” attitude or
151. See supra Parts I.E.2., II.B.
152. If neither the lawyer nor the client has the information, the lawyer may be able to obtain it from public
sources or suggest that the client determine it to the extent practicable. If for no other reasons, the lawyer should
advise that such risks should be known for purposes of avoiding potential tort liabilities.
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understanding of such questions as applied by the relevant corporate decision-
makers in this situation. This might be a quite complicated question of the
interaction of corporate culture and the particular decision makers involved. The
lawmakers and enforcement actors are remote; their knowledge general and
based on the aggregate situation. The lawyer, to the contrary, is in the immediate
situation, with context specific information.153 This seems the kind of situation
appropriate for the exercise of discretion and practical wisdom.
On the other hand, each of the six difficulties with character and discretion
described above is arguably apposite to this situation.154 Of particular concern
would be the likely variability of approach to the situation by different lawyers
(best categorized under the fourth difficulty). Some lawyers are likely to
understand the formal .05 limit as a prohibition or norm which the client is
obligated to follow. Others are likely to see the more flexible enforcement
practices as indicating a potential cost the client has discretion to factor into its
effluent and pollution decisions, and discount by their probability. Lawyers are
thus likely to vary widely on their understanding of the significance of the gap
between the .05 formal line and the enforcement actualities. The information the
client receives about the legal limit and its enforcement may well depend on the
particular lawyer advising it. Moreover, the tone and attitude toward enforcement
and violation (and the attendant advice) are also likely to vary. If lawyers are
understood as one of the primary ways that law is transmitted and applied, then
this would be a significant problem in regard to equality and uniformity of
application of this particular legal provision.155 Leaving aside the legal limit and
enforcement practices, lawyers are also likely to vary on their understanding of
the seriousness of the risks and costs attendant to water pollution in this rural
area. Some may be inclined to see such relatively mild pollution as unimportant
or not harmful in light of the benefit of the client’s enterprise; others might be
more likely to see ammonia pollution as a significant harm and wrong. Variability
in regard to this fundamental aspect of the situation will also affect the
information and advice received by the client.
This troubling variability of legal advice and counsel under a character and
discretion guide could be removed by the use of a rule, but it is unclear what such
a rule should allow or require. A rule framed on the premise that the profession’s
underlying role is to provide access to the law might require that all information
about the law relevant to a client’s decision ought to be conveyed to the client,
leaving decisions about how and to what extent to be influenced by that law to the
client. Given that the current paradigm is client centered in this way, it should be
no surprise that the current rules can be read in just this way. Rule 1.4 (b) requires
153. Pepper, More Than the Law, supra note 59, at 693–95.
154. See supra Part III.D.
155. As noted above, Professor Kaufman has suggested that such variability is just part of human nature.
Kaufman, supra note 104.
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that a lawyer “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” Rule 2.1
requires that a “lawyer render candid advice.” From these rules it would appear
that the lawyer is required to inform the client about both the formal .05 line and
about the limiting enforcement practices.
As an alternative, we might frame a rule that would prohibit advice about the
law that facilitates its violation. It would be a rule focused more on protecting the
community from the client, rather than the other way around (the second
dichotomy). It would be a rule that sees the client as the risk, not the one in need
of protection (the first dichotomy). And, despite the fact that our current rules are
primarily client protective and client centered, there is now a rule that could be
understood to include just such a prohibition. Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer
“shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .” Whether informing the client of the
currently limited nature of enforcement of the .05 effluent rule would constitute
“assistance in criminal conduct” remains unclear.156 If not, it would seem that
under Rules 1.4 (b) and 2.1 the lawyer would be required to inform the client of
enforcement facts which might well lead to violation of the limit and pollution at
higher levels than the .05 line.157 The underlying question here is: who is to make
the choice, client or lawyer, as to how to be influenced by the law, and whether to
consider it a binding norm or, to the contrary, merely a discretionary risk and
foreseeable possible cost.158
One could, of course, consider adopting other possible rules to govern such
situations. An attempt could be made to reconcile the two differing directives of
Rules 1.4 and 1.2(d) in a general manner.159 Or an attempt could be made to
frame a more specific rule for regulatory matters, or possibly an even more
specific rule framed for industrial pollution.160 As noted above, a consideration of
possible rules under the third dichotomy tends to move beyond the scope of the
more general and theoretical exploration undertaken here and into the subject
matter and complications of that particular rule.161
156. For an extensive discussion and further references, see Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 33,
at 1551; for an application to the situation of advice concerning enforcement of the federal criminal prohibition
on marijuana sales in states that have legalized such transactions, see Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana
Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 ORE. L. REV. 869, 919 (2013).
157. The tension in the two arguably conflicting rule requirements can currently be reconciled in this
situation by a limitation within the text of Rule 1.2(d) itself: Despite the prohibition on counsel or assistance, “a
lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client . . .” MODEL RULES
R. 1.2(d). The possible or likely enforcement results and consequences of discharge in excess of .05 grams per
liter would seem clearly to fall within this proviso. Thus the text of 1.2(d) appears to defer to the requirements of
Model Rule 1.4.
158. Pepper, Integrating Morality, supra note 56, at 1022–23; supra Part IV.C.1.
159. Pepper, Integrating Morality, supra note 56, at 1022–23.
160. See supra Part III.E.2.
161. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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4. DEFEASIBILITY OF THE APPLICABLE RULES
The discussion above suggested a possible method for gaining some of the
benefits of both rules and a discretionary approach: having a set of rules where
they seem necessary, appropriate or helpful, but having those rules themselves be
to some extent discretionary or defeasible.162 Assuming that current Rules 1.4
and 1.2 would require providing enforcement related advice that the lawyer
concluded was likely to lead to violation of the ammonia effluent limit, at least
two possible factors might weigh toward a choice not to follow the rules
completely in this instance. First, as noted above, the justifications for an ethic
centered on client protection and client interests may be significantly weaker
when the client is a large corporation. In such a situation management’s role
specific ethic of serving shareholder value or profit may well bias or interfere
with a decision to follow or exceed the legal effluent limit. There might be a
tendency to see law as more cost and risk calculation than as obligatory norm.163
Those in the corporation making this particular decision might also have
developed a perception of legal regulation as nuisance, as intrusive and possibly
heavy-handed or insensitive to actual risks and practicalities. Second, the lawyer
may perceive serious harms to innocent third parties as potentially resulting from
the ammonia discharge. The client may well be discounting such harms, or
insufficiently sensitive to them, possibly for the corporate reasons just suggested.
Following deliberation on the particular factors involved in the specific
situation,164 the lawyer may conclude that in this instance the full requirements of
Rules 1.4 and 1.2 are inappropriate. The lawyer may choose to simply convey
that the .05 ammonia limit is the legal requirement, period. The lawyer here
would have chosen to give essentially preemptory advice: “This is the law that
you have to follow.”165 Of course there is a range here of how preemptory to
make the advice: perhaps the “that you have to follow” part will be not so
absolute, or perhaps left out altogether.
162. See supra Part III.E.3.
163. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the amoral role “squared.”
164. See supra Part III.E.3. on the need for deliberation.
165. Professor Hazard suggests that,
[a]dvice that is technical in form and peremptory in effect can be given only under special conditions.
The text of the law has to be quite clear. There has to be a substantial possibility that the law will be
invoked. The consequences that may result if the law is invoked have to be serious. For a private
client, this set of circumstances usually arises only when the conduct in question is what used to be
called malum in se as distinguished from malum prohibitum, that is, conduct that is wrongful
according to accepted morality and not simply wrong according to legal proscription.
GEOFFREY HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 148 (1978). Professor Hazard’s requirements would
appear not to be met in the water pollution application, suggesting he would conclude that advice about the
enforcement realities must be provided to the client. That is one of the reasons that the possibility of defeasible
ethical obligations merits serious consideration. For more on the malum in se versus malum prohibitum
distinction in regard to this application, see Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 33, at 1576–1580.
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A more stark illustration may also be helpful. Consider the criminal defense
lawyer with a client about to go on trial for capital murder. The maximum penalty
for witness tampering is minor compared to the probable result of the trial.166 Is
this situation analogous to the ammonia effluent situation in regard to the
applicability of Rules 1.4, 1.2 and 2.1? Does the lawyer have an arguably similar
obligation to inform the client of the possibility of “communicating” with
witnesses, the probable criminality of such conduct, and the possible penalties?
The limited enforcement practices in regard to the water pollution violation are
arguably more closely connected to the violation itself than is witness tampering
to the murder charge and trial, but the possibility of witness tampering is directly
relevant nonetheless (and of much more important consequence to the life of the
client). Providing such advice intuitively seems to fall more directly under the
prohibition in Rule 1.2(d) of “counseling” or “assisting” in criminal conduct than
it does under the obligations of Rules 1.4, 1.2(a) and 2.1 to inform the client of
that which is legally relevant. As noted above, however, the text of Rule 1.2(d)
indicates that “a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed
course of conduct,”167 thus seemingly approving discussion of both the
criminality and consequences (both positive and negative) of witness intimida-
tion. Particularly if the client asks about this possibility, the lawyer arguably has
an obligation of candid advice under the current rules, including concerning the
possible penalties. Acting upon character and discretion to conclude that this is a
situation where the rules requiring communication ought not be applied—thus,
where defeasance is appropriate—would appear to be an attractive and highly
useful option. Most lawyers, one would think, would opt for the preemptory
advice: witness tampering is criminal; you can’t do it. If the client asked for
further information about enforcement likelihood and possible penalties, the
lawyer could refuse to provide it, and repeat the preemptory advice.168
Before moving on it should be noted that the possibility of defeasance may be
attractive in other instances we have considered. In the first application
considered above, delaying tactics in litigation, the lawyer may simply choose
not to inform the corporate construction client of the option of delaying matters to
add additional pressure on the plaintiff for a favorable (but unjust) settlement.
Exercising character, judgment, and discretion, the lawyer might conclude that
this situation is an occasion when the obligations of Rules 1.4 and 1.2 are best left
unmet—that is, defeasance of the applicability of those rules to this particular
situation. As discussed above, there are factors weighing both for and against
lawyers having such discretion.169
166. See Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 33, at 1551, n.9.
167. See supra note 157.
168. See HAZARD, supra note 165, at 143–49; Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 33, at 1551.
169. See supra Part III.
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V. CONCLUSION: BRIDGES AND CONNECTIONS
Several common themes have developed as the dichotomies have been
sketched out and explored:
Corporations are Different. Corporations are more dangerous to third parties.
As discussed above,170 corporations are different in at least two ways. First,
relatively large corporations are more powerful (and thus capable of causing
greater harm) than almost all individuals. The purpose of incorporation is to
allow the aggregation of capital and of multiple coordinated human effort to
allow vastly increased effectiveness in the world. The scale of effects that a
corporation can have is vastly different, in general, from that of individuals.
Second, corporations have more limited motivations than ordinary persons,
generally focused on or limited to financial and material goals. The fundamental
end is usually shareholder profit or value, a quite limited function when
compared to the complexity and range of individual human motivation, values
and ends.171 Also, one should note, a dangerously limited end. Third, communi-
cating with and correctly understanding the goals and intentions of a corporation
is far more difficult and complex than with an individual. The corporation acts
through multiple individuals, each of whom has a limited range of authorization.
These individuals can have complex (sometimes conflicting) relations with the
corporate entity and with each other. Taking direction from a corporation and
having a conversation with it (including a moral conversation) is often not simple
or obvious.172 Who is authorized to deliberate and speak for the corporation, and
to what extent and in what circumstances, is often far from transparent. The
degree to which corporations and other organizations are different varies. A
corporation that is the major life project of an individual, or of a small group of
individuals, may well function and have the range of motivations and values
more like an individual. From this perspective we have a spectrum, with
individuals and very small organizations on one end and the very large
corporations on the other.
It would therefore be helpful for lawyers serving corporations to keep the first
two dichotomies in mind when ethical problems arise. Who is threatened with
harm, and who needs protection; who is relatively strong, and who is relatively
weak? Should the lawyer be primarily concerned with serving and protecting the
client and its interests, or with possibly restraining the client from harmful use of
the law? Ought the ordinary allegiance toward the client be diluted because of its
170. See supra Part I.C.
171. One way of expressing this is that corporations do not have a conscience. This is true, but it is somewhat
simplistic and limited to but one area of the vast range of possible individual human motivations.
172. The current Model Rules address this complexity with a short descriptive statement: “A lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.” MODEL RULES R. 1.13(a). Sections (b) through (g) of the rule then address some specific limited
aspects of the complexity of corporate representation. MODEL RULES R. 1.13(b)–(g).
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nature as a corporation, and, if so, how can this appropriately and ethically be
effectuated? Consideration of these questions leads in turn to other possibilities
developed through our focus on the dichotomies.
Counseling. One way to restrain the possibly wrongful use of the law is to
counsel with the client—particularly the corporate client—to make explicit that
the potential conduct, although lawful and to the client’s benefit, may be morally
wrongful in that it is unjustifiably harmful to the legitimate interest of others.173
Conversation with the client can make explicit who is relatively strong and who
relatively weak. It can make explicit that legal rights and lawful conduct do not
necessarily equate to morally justifiable conduct: there is more to be considered
than just whether the conduct to be facilitated is lawful and in the client’s interest.
With the client’s input the conversation can consider whether the lawyer’s
primary allegiance in the particular situation should be to the client, or to some
larger interest, and how those interests might be harmonized. And if the client is
corporate, it can similarly make explicit questions of whether shareholder
interests are properly primary in the context of the particular situation and its
risks, thus possibly ameliorating the problem of the amoral ethics “squared.”174
Conversations can be imagined that would be helpful for each of the three
situations considered in Part IV, above. Dialogue of this sort is useful even if not
effective in changing the prospective conduct of the client in that it enlivens and
enriches our shared moral experience and understanding, while a purely legal and
material perspective may well diminish and impoverish it. The client’s expecta-
tions and perception (a significant part of the moral landscape) may change as a
result of such counsel and conversation, affecting future perception and actions,
even if the proposed conduct goes forward. Counseling can thus help effectuate
explicit consideration of each of the three dichotomies, making for a much richer
understanding of the ethical question at issue.
Rules. Keeping the three dichotomies and the choices they entail more
explicitly in mind is also likely to improve the framing, amending and application
of our rules of professional conduct. Those rules currently appear to focus on risk
to the vulnerable client from the more powerful and knowledgeable professional,
rather than on possible risk to third parties and the public from the powerful
lawyer-client combination.175 This could be addressed by framing different sets
of rules for the two quite different risks entailed by the work of lawyers, or by
developing additional rules for the second risk to add to the now predominant
stance of the rules as a whole. We could similarly be both more explicit and more
nuanced in the rules about the issues of the second dichotomy: where is the
primary allegiance of the lawyer, and how are conflicting allegiances to be
173. See supra Parts I.E.2.b and III.E.4.
174. See supra Part I.C.
175. See supra Part I.
1132 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 28:1069
balanced?176 The rules could also be more explicit about, and provide more
guidance in relation to, in what areas and situations lawyers have discretion and
are not bound by rule. Incorporating within the rules more expressly the presence
of discretion, how it should be exercised and guided, and what the limits might
be, could provide helpful ethical encouragement and assistance to practicing
lawyers. Rules could signal that such decisions exist, that they involve serious
ethical questions, and provide guidance or structure for approaching them.
Defeasance: Rules as Rebuttable Presumptions. One possible bridge between
rules on one hand, and judgment, character and discretion on the other, is the
possibility of rules in general, or at least some rules, as being defeasible. Rules
could be presumptively applicable to the situations they cover, but the presump-
tion could be rebutted under the particular circumstances.177 This possibility
could function as a bridge across the first dichotomy as well: Rules designed to
protect vulnerable clients might be suspect—and subject to possible defeasance—
when apparently applicable in situations where the client’s lawyer facilitated
conduct threatened unjustifiable harm to others. And rules designed to protect
third parties from wrongful client conduct might be less likely applicable when
the situation involved not a threat to third parties but a relatively vulnerable
client. Although posing difficulties in implementation, such a regime is attractive
in the possibility of joining some of the advantages of rules with the quite
different advantages of character, judgment and discretion. Even if not adopted as
part of a formal structure of regulation, the procedure remains a possibility for
individual lawyers in their ethical deliberation and choices.
Conclusion. This article began with the suggestion that the way we understand
and approach questions of lawyers’ professional ethics is to a significant extent
determined by several underlying conceptual dichotomies. The more these
foundational assumptions remain implicit and unidentified, the less we will be
able to make fully informed ethical decisions—whether at the level of specific
conduct, rule framing, or more general theory. The article has been an effort to
identify and explore three of these fundamental conceptual questions. Is the
primary purpose of lawyers’ ethics to protect vulnerable clients from the more
powerful and knowledgeable lawyers who are making a living through providing
assistance to them in the use of the law? Or is that purpose to protect the rest of us
from the threat of the combination of the powerful (often corporate) client and the
power of the law as leveraged through the sophisticated, knowledgeable lawyer?
The first is the traditional concern of professionalism in general; the second has
been the more pressing concern for lawyers’ ethics over recent decades. Second,
is the underlying obligation and allegiance of lawyers in their day-to-day work to
the client only, essentially excluding (or at the least marginalizing) concern for
176. See supra Part II.
177. See supra Parts I.E.2.d, III.C, and III.E.3.
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the interests of others, or the common interest, affected by that work? Again, the
traditional understanding—in part in answer to the threat perceived in the first
dichotomy—has been an almost exclusive allegiance to the client’s interests.
Third, and quite different, how do we best effectuate professional ethics for
lawyers, whatever the primary purpose or function may be? Is a system of rules
best? That has been our assumption over the last fifty years, as reflected in the
adoption of three iterations of such rules and efforts to expand and improve
regulatory structures to enforce them. Or would we be better served relying on
the judgment, character and discretion of individual lawyers applied in light of
the entire context of the particular situation?
The discussion in each of the first three parts above sketched the two quite
different alternative understandings and assumptions of the three conceptual
divides. In each case, this was followed by developing the possible choices
presented and possible bridges connecting the alternate sides of each dichotomy.
Three not uncommon problematic ethical scenarios were then presented to
illustrate how these basic dichotomies would apply. The primary intention has
been to make these distinctions and the choices they present more explicit.
Awareness of the dichotomies assists in broadening the perspective and keeping
the mind more open in relation to ethical problems at all levels. For the practicing
lawyer, the academic scholar and teacher, and the student, keeping the
dichotomies in mind helps in perceiving an ethical problem, framing a conceptual
understanding, and considering solutions.
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